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ABSTRACT
Should social media companies ban Holocaust denial from
their platforms? What about conspiracy theorists that spew hate?
Does good corporate citizenship mean platforms should remove
offensive speech or tolerate it? The content moderation rules that
companies develop to govern speech on their platforms will have
significant implications for the future of freedom of expression.
Given that the prospects for compelling platforms to respect
users’ free speech rights are bleak within the U.S. system, what
can be done to protect this important right?
In June 2018, the United Nations’ top expert for freedom of
expression called on companies to align their speech codes with
standards embodied in international human rights law,
particularly the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR). After the controversy over de-platforming Alex
Jones in August 2018, Twitter’s CEO agreed that his company
should root its values in international human rights law and
Facebook referenced this body of law in discussing its content
moderation policies.
This is the first article to explore what companies would need
to do to align the substantive restrictions in their speech codes
with Article 19 of the ICCPR, which is the key international
standard for protecting freedom of expression. In order to
examine this issue in a concrete way, this Article assesses whether
Twitter’s hate speech rules would need to be modified. This
Article also evaluates potential benefits of and concerns with
aligning corporate speech codes with this international standard.
This Article concludes it would be both feasible and desirable for
companies to ground their speech codes in this standard;
however, further multi-stakeholder discussions would be helpful
to clarify certain issues that arise in translating international
human rights law into a corporate context.

†

The author is the Herman G. Kaiser Chair in International Law and the Director
of the Center for International Business & Human Rights at the University of
Oklahoma’s College of Law. Previously, she served as the director of the human
rights law office at the U.S. Department of State. The author wishes to thank
Stanford University’s Global Digital Policy Incubator for inviting her to
participate in a variety of events in which issues of freedom of expression and
content moderation were discussed, which contributed to her consideration of
these issues. The author thanks Rebeca West for her research assistance. The
views are solely those of the author.

27

THE FUTURE OF FREEDOM
OF EXPRESSION ONLINE

[Vol. 17

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ………………………………………………….…....27
I. BACKGROUND ON RELEVANT UN STANDARDS ……………………35
A. International Human Rights Law
& Freedom of Expression......…………………………………35
B. The UN Guiding Principles on Business & Human
Rights………………………………………………………….38
1. General Background…………………………………….…38
2. The UNGPs in the Context of Social Media Companies …39
3. What about the Free Expression Rights
of Social Media Companies?………………………………40
C. The UN Special Rapporteur’s Report…………………………41
II. ALIGNING CORPORATE SPEECH CODES WITH INTERNATIONAL
STANDARDS ………………………………………………………42
A. Twitter’s General Approach to Online Speech.……………... 43
B. Twitter’s Approach to Hate Speech…………………………...45
1. Is Twitter’s Hate Speech Ban Vague? …………………….46
2. Do Twitter’s Hate Speech Rules Constitute the “Least
Intrusive Means?” ………………………………………...47
3. Is Twitter’s Hate Speech Ban Imposed for a
Legitimate Aim?..……...………………….………………52
4. Observations on Applying the UNGPs
to Corporate Speech Codes………………………………..56
III. REFLECTIONS ON POTENTIAL CRITICISMS AND BENEFITS OF HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW AS THE DEFAULT RULE FOR CORPORATE SPEECH
CODES ……………………………………………………………57
A. Criticisms……………………………………………………...57
B. Benefits………………………………………………………..64
C. Observations on Criticisms and Benefits..….…………………67
IV. CONCLUSION……………………………………………………...67
.........

INTRODUCTION
In the summer days leading up to July 4th, 2018, The Vindicator,
a small newspaper based in Liberty, Texas, decided to post on its Facebook
page a few paragraphs from the Declaration of Independence. 1 Facebook
blocked the tenth post because the content of those paragraphs of the
Declaration violated its hate speech rules. 2 Though it did not identify what

Casey Stinnett, Facebook’s Program Thinks Declaration of Independence is
Hate Speech, THE VINDICATOR (July 2, 2018, 4:46 PM), http://www.thevindicator
.com/news/article_556e1014-7e41-11e8-a85e-ab264c30e973.html.
2
Id. The Vindicator’s tenth post contained the following language from the
Declaration of Independence:
1
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portion of the post was offensive, Facebook instructed the newspaper to
remove any material that was inconsistent with its speech code.3 The
newspaper was unable to reach anyone at Facebook to appeal the
decision.4 The Vindicator published an article about what had happened,
and this article was picked up by a number of news outlets in the United
States and abroad, 5 shining a bright light on this corporate censorship like
fireworks illuminating an evening sky. Despite being concerned about
losing its Facebook page if future posts were also deemed unacceptable,
The Vindicator reminded its readers that a corporation is not a
governmental actor and “as such it is allowed to restrict use of its services
as long as those restrictions do not violate any laws.”6 Within about a day,
Facebook apologized and restored the content. 7
Two weeks later, Facebook again made headlines about its speech
code—this time for the opposite reason—when its CEO (Mark
Zuckerberg) defended the company’s decision to permit Holocaust denial

He has abdicated Government here, by declaring us out of his
Protection and waging War against us. He has plundered our seas,
ravaged our Coasts, burnt our towns, and destroyed the lives of our
people. He is at this time transporting large Armies of foreign
Mercenaries to compleat the works of death, desolation and tyranny,
already begun with circumstances of Cruelty & perfidy scarcely
paralleled in the most barbarous ages, and totally unworthy the Head
of a civilized nation. He has constrained our fellow Citizens taken
Captive on the high Seas to bear Arms against their Country, to
become the executioners of their friends and Brethren, or to fall
themselves by their Hands. He has excited domestic insurrections
amongst us, and has endeavoured to bring on the inhabitants of our
frontiers, the merciless Indian Savages, whose known rule of
warfare, is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes and
conditions.
Id.
3
Id. The Vindicator surmised that the phrase “Indian Savages” triggered
Facebook’s automated detection system for hate speech and that there had been
no human review of the content. Id. This Article uses the phrase “speech code” or
“speech rules” to refer to the terms of service and other rules issued by companies
that substantively regulate user-generated content on their platforms.
4
Id. The newspaper did send a general feedback message to Facebook about the
situation. Id.
5
See, e.g., Kevin Kelleher, Facebook Reportedly Apologizes after Flagging the
Declaration of Independence as Hate Speech, FORTUNE (July 5, 2018),
http://fortune.com/2018/07/05/facebook-apologizes-declaration-independencehate-speech-racist-vindicator/; Annie Grayer, Facebook Apologizes after
Labeling Part of Declaration of Independence ‘Hate Speech,’ CNN (July 5, 2018,
5:45 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/05/politics/facebook-post-hate-speechdelete-declaration-of-independence-mistake/index.html;
Facebook
Finds
Independence Document ‘Racist,’ BBC NEWS (July 5, 2018),
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-44722728.
6
Stinnett, supra note 1. The first comment posted after the article argued that the
First Amendment should apply to companies like Facebook. Id.
7
Id.
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posts on the platform.8 He stated users who upload such content were not
“intentionally getting it wrong.”9 Unsurprisingly, his rationale triggered a
backlash of commentary given the vast proof that this atrocity happened,
with many criticizing Facebook’s decision to permit the hateful posts.10
Soon thereafter, Mr. Zuckerberg clarified that he found Holocaust denials
offensive and that he did not mean to defend the intent of deniers.11 He
explained his company would prevent the spread of misinformation by
reducing its visibility on Facebook’s News Feed, but would not prevent
users from saying untrue things.12 He did, however, note that advocacy of
hatred and violence against protected groups would be removed.13 This
controversy led one commentator to say Facebook’s policy “is a
hodgepodge of declarations and exceptions and exceptions to the
exceptions.” 14 Another reflected on the controversy by musing “[i]s it

8

Brett Molina, Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg, Rebuked for Comments on
Holocaust Denial, Tries to Explain, USA TODAY (July 19, 2018, 9:22 AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/nation-now/2018/07/19/facebook-markzuckerberg-clarifies-comments-holocaust-deniers/799438002/; Lydia O’Connor,
Mark Zuckerberg Says Facebook Won’t Remove Holocaust Denial Content,
HUFFINGTON POST (July 18, 2018, 2:53 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com
/entry/zuckerberg-facebook-holocaust-denial_us_5b4f70f5e4b0de86f48901ea.
9
O’Connor, supra note 8.
10
See, e.g., Deborah Lipstadt, Zuckerberg’s Comments Give Holocaust Deniers
an Opening, CNN (July 18, 2018, 8:43 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/
07/18/opinions/mark-zuckerberg-facebook-holocaust-denial-lipstadt-opinion/
index.html (arguing the agenda of Holocaust deniers is to “spread the very hatred
that produced the Holocaust.”); Molina, supra note 8; O’Connor, supra note 8.
11
Kara Swisher, Mark Zuckerberg Clarifies: ‘I Personally Find Holocaust Denial
Deeply Offensive, and I Absolutely Didn’t Intend to Defend the Intent of Those
Who Deny That,’ RECODE (July 18, 2018, 4:40 PM), https://www.recode.net/2018
/7/18/17588116/mark-zuckerberg-clarifies-holocaust-denial-offensive.
12
Id. (According to Zuckerberg, “[i]f something is spreading and is rated false by
fact checkers, it would lose the vast majority of its distribution in News Feed. And
of course if a post crossed [the] line into advocating for violence or hate against a
particular group, it would be removed. These issues are very challenging but I
believe that often the best way to fight offensive bad speech is with good
speech.”).
13
Id. That same day, Facebook issued an official policy that would allow it to
remove misinformation in the form of advocacy of incitement to violence offline.
Sheera Frenkel, Facebook to Remove Misinformation that Leads to Violence,
N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/18/technology/
facebook-to-remove-misinformation-that-leads-to-violence.html?rref=collection
%2Fsectioncollection%2Ftechnology&action=click&contentCollection=technol
ogy&region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=
3&pgtype=section.
14
Farhad Manjoo, What Stays on Facebook and What Goes? The Social Network
Cannot Answer, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/
07/19/technology/facebook-misinformation.html.
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ideal for a private company to define its own standards for speech and
propagate them across the world? No. But here we are.”15
Perhaps we should not be surprised that private actors are
engaging in a parallel governance exercise alongside governments in
regulating online speech.16 In 1977, Oxford Professor Hedley Bull
predicted that the international system could morph from being based on
nation-states to one in which nations would share authority over their
citizens with a variety of other powerful actors, including transnational
corporations.17 He called this new international order “neo-medieval”
because in medieval Europe there were not nation-states but rather a
variety of competing powerful actors in society that exercised various
forms of governance over individuals.18 Given that global social media
companies now exercise traditional governmental functions by, among
other things, enforcing their own speech codes on their platforms19 (a
process that is known somewhat euphemistically as “content
moderation”), it appears that aspects of Professor Bull’s neo-medieval
world have materialized.20
15

Alexis Madrigal, Why Facebook Wants to Give You the Benefit of the Doubt,
THE ATLANTIC (July 19, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/
2018/07/why-facebook-wants-to-give-you-the-benefit-of-the-doubt/565598/.
16
Governments have also been active in regulating online speech. See generally
SANJA KELLY, ET AL., FREEDOM HOUSE, SILENCING THE MESSENGER:
COMMUNICATION APPS UNDER PRESSURE (2016), https://freedomhouse.org/
sites/default/files/FOTN_2016_BOOKLET_FINAL.pdf (finding high levels of
censorship by governments throughout the world for online speech that is
otherwise protected under international human rights law).
17
HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF ORDER IN WORLD
POLITICS 245–46, 254–266 (2d. ed. 1995). See also ANTHONY CLARK AREND,
LEGAL R ULES AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 180–84 (1999) (arguing that after
the Cold War the state-based system transitioned towards Professor Bull’s neomedieval system for several reasons, including the disintegration of states, the
inability of states to provide for the needs of citizens, the provision of key services
by transnational corporations, and the increased law making role of non-state
actors).
18
BULL, supra note 17, at 245.
19
For example, Facebook had 1.47 billion daily users and 2.23 billion monthly
users as of June 2018. Company Info, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM,
https://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/ (last visited Aug. 4, 2018). The company
has 7,500 content moderators who cover every time zone and 50 languages in
implementing Facebook’s speech code (which is found in its “Community
Standards”) on a worldwide basis. Ellen Silver, Hard Questions: Who Reviews
Objectionable Content on Facebook – and is the Company Doing Enough to
Support Them?, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (July 26, 2018), https://newsroom.fb.
com/news/2018/07/hard-questions-content-reviewers/ (releasing information on
its content moderation because “in recent weeks, more people have been asking
about where we draw the line for what’s allowed on Facebook and whether our
content reviewers are capable of applying these standards in a fair, consistent
manner around the world.”).
20
The trajectory towards a neo-medieval world has been further accelerated by
nation-states proactively outsourcing their traditional governance functions over
speech to social media companies by requiring them to adjudicate whether
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The rules companies develop to govern speech on their platforms
will have significant implications for the future of freedom of expression
and indeed democracy both in the United States and abroad. Even the U.S.
Supreme Court has recognized that one of the most important places to
exchange views is in cyberspace, particularly on social media.21 But how
much will it matter ten or fifteen years from now that the First Amendment
(and international human rights law) protect freedom of expression, if
most communication happens online and is regulated by private platforms
that do not—and are not required to—adhere to such long standing
substantive norms on expression?22
The controversies over Facebook’s deletion of paragraphs from
the Declaration of Independence followed by its permission of Holocaust
denial posts exemplify what is now a consistent news cycle regarding
private sector content moderation practices. For example, a few weeks
after those controversies, major social media companies were again
making headlines when they banned conspiracy theorist Alex Jones from
their platforms; Twitter, however, garnered attention initially for not deplatforming him (although Twitter later suspended him and ultimately
banned him permanently).23 In recent years, there have been numerous
national and regional speech regulations are being violated online rather than
having such issues adjudicated in courts. See, e.g., Alice Cuddy, German Law
under Fire for Turning Social Media Companies into ‘Overzealous Censors,’
EURO NEWS (Feb. 14, 2018), http://www.euronews.com/2018/02/14/german-lawunder-fire-for-turning-social-media-companies-into-overzealous-censors(discussing a recent German law that requires social media companies to decide
if online speech violates the country’s criminal code and to remove illegal speech
or face significant penalties); Jens-Henrik Jeppesen, First Report on the EU Hate
Speech Code of Conduct Shows Need for Transparency, Judicial Oversight, and
Appeals, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH.: BLOG (Dec. 12, 2016),
https://cdt.org/blog/first-report-eu-hate-speech-code-of-conduct-shows-needtransparency-judicial-oversight-appeals/ (describing how the European Union has
outsourced adjudicating its hate speech standards to social media companies).
21
Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017).
22
As private sector actors, corporate speech decisions do not constitute
governmental action and thus traditional sources of domestic (and international
human rights) law on the permissibility of speech restrictions are not directly
applicable to their actions. See Marvin Ammori, The “New” New York Times:
Free Speech Lawyering in the Age of Google and Twitter, 127 HARV. L. REV.
2259, 2273–83 (2014). Furthermore, in the United States, online intermediaries
are (with a few exceptions) protected from liability for third party content, giving
them significant discretion to regulate speech on their platforms. Id. at 2284–98;
Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing
Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1604–09 (2018). For a discussion of the
substantial challenges to compelling platforms to respect free speech rights of
users under U.S. law, see generally Kyle Langvardt, Regulating Online Content
Moderation, 106 GEO. L.J. 1353 (2018).
23
Alex Jones runs the Infowars website and has promoted a number of conspiracy
theories, “such as that the Sandy Hook school shooting was a hoax and that
Democrats run a global child-sex ring.” Jack Nicas, Alex Jones and Infowars
Content is Removed from Apple, Facebook, and YouTube, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6,
2018), https://nytimes.com/2018/08/06/technology/infowars-alefx-jones-apple-
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calls for social media companies to remove various forms of offensive
speech from their platforms as well as criticism that such companies delete
too much speech.24 In July 2018, Congress held a hearing to question
social media companies about their content moderation practices.25 Given

facebook-spotify.html. When Apple, Facebook, and YouTube removed most of
Alex Jones’ posts from their platforms, the tech giants thrust “themselves into a
fraught debate over their role in regulating what can be said online.” Id.; Cecelia
Kang & Kate Conger, Inside Twitter’s Struggle Over What Gets Banned, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/10/technology/
twitter-free-speech-infowars.html (reporting on internal deliberations at Twitter
about dehumanizing speech in the wake of criticism for not banning Alex Jones);
Tony Romm, Twitter has Permanently Banned Alex Jones and Infowars, WASH.
POST (Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2018/09/06/
twitter-has-permanently-banned-alex-jonesinfowars/?utm_term=.db721d364631
(reporting on Twitter’s decision to suspend and then ban Alex Jones).
24
See, e.g., Charlie Warzel, “A Honeypot for Assholes”: Inside Twitter’s 10-Year
Failure to Stop Harassment, BUZZFEED NEWS (Aug. 11, 2016, 8:43 AM),
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/charliewarzel/a-honeypot-for-assholesinside-twitters-10-year-failure-to-s (describing Twitter’s attempts to deal with
abusive language given its commitment to free speech); Tracy Jan & Elizabeth
Dwoskin, Silicon Valley Escalates Its War on White Supremacy Despite Free
Speech
Concerns,
WASH.
POST
(Aug.
16,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/silicon-valley-escalates-itswar-on-white-supremacy-despite-free-speech-concerns/2017/08/16/842771b8829b-11e7-902a-2a9f2d808496_story.html?utm_term=.8c4f8105c832
(describing platform removals of hate speech after the 2017 deadly white
supremacy rally in Charlottesville); People Don’t Trust Social Media – That’s a
Growing Problem for Businesses, CBS NEWS (Jun. 18, 2018, 6:45 AM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/edelman-survey-shows-low-trust-in-socialmedia/ (reporting 60% of survey participants want more government regulation
of social media and over 66% want companies to do more to protect users from
offensive content); Nabiha Syed & Ben Smith, A First Amendment for Social
Platforms, MEDIUM (June 2, 2016), https://medium.com/@BuzzFeed/a-firstamendment-for-social-platforms-202c0eab7054 (criticizing company speech
codes as “improvised,” not grounded in tradition or principle, and lacking
transparency).
25
Facebook, Google, and Twitter: Examining the Content Filtering Practices of
Social Media Giants, Hearing Before the House Judiciary Comm., 115th Cong.
(2018),
https://judiciary.house.gov/hearing/facebook-google-and-twitterexamining-the-content-filtering-practices-of-social-media-giants/ (highlighting
that some representatives expressed concerns that the platforms were banning too
much speech or were engaging in politically motivated content moderation while
others claimed companies were not banning enough speech). In early September,
the House and Senate held further hearings involving Russian misinformation
online as well as content moderation. Farhad Manjoo, What Jack Dorsey and
Sheryl Sandberg Taught Congress and Vice Versa, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/06/technology/jack-dorsey-sheryl-sandbergcongress-hearings.html. Soon thereafter, then-U.S. Attorney General Jeff
Sessions convened his state counterparts to discuss freedom of speech and content
moderation. Brian Fung & Tony Romm, Inside the Private Justice Department
Meeting That Could Lead to New Investigations of Facebook, Google and Other
Tech Giants, WASH. POST (Sept. 25, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
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significant pressure to “clean up” their platforms, some have opined that
we have reached a tipping point of sorts in which social media companies
are profoundly re-thinking their initial pro-free speech inclinations.26 At
the end of July, the market capitalizations of Facebook and Twitter
dropped significantly, in part because of the rising costs of securing their
platforms and bolstering their global content moderation. 27 In a timely and
comprehensive book examining content moderation by social media
companies, author Tarleton Gillespie states that “it is wholly unclear what
the standards should be for content moderation.” 28
The summer of 2018 seems to mark a liminal moment in the
evolution of social media speech codes that will shape the future of free
expression online in our neo-medieval world. So where do we go from
here? Should companies be free to set their own rules for speech on their
platforms based on their economic incentives and/or own views of
technology/2018/09/25/inside-big-meeting-federal-state-law-enforcement-thatsignaled-new-willingness-investigate-tech-giants/?utm_term=.bd73f664c69d.
26
Julia Wong & Olivia Solon, Does the Banning of Alex Jones Signal a New Era
of Big Tech Responsibility?, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 10, 2018, 7:00 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/aug/10/alex-jones-banningapple-facebook-youtube-twitter-free-speech (“[W]e are at an inflection point in
the way internet platforms conceive of and protect public discourse for society at
large.”). Other commentators acknowledge a shift is occurring in how such firms
approach speech but have expressed more concern about the potential
consequences of private sector content moderation for freedom of expression. See,
e.g., Farhad Manjoo, Tech Companies Like Facebook and Twitter are Drawing
Lines. It’ll be Messy, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/07/25/technology/tech-companies-facebook-twitter-responsibility.html
(arguing that the “absolutist ethos” of tech companies is over and expressing
concerns about their power to shape global discourse through content
moderation); Madrigal, supra note 15 (“You don’t need to be a free-speech
absolutist to imagine how this unprecedented, opaque, and increasingly
sophisticated system [of content moderation] could have unintended
consequences or be used to (intentionally or not) squelch minority viewpoints.”).
27
Peter Eavis, The Cost of Policing Twitter and Facebook is Spooking Wall St. It
Shouldn’t., N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/
07/27/business/dealbook/facebook-twitter-wall-street.html (reporting Facebook’s
costs increased by 50% from 2017 to pay for, among other things, hiring hundreds
of content moderators). Before their stocks tumbled, some had argued it was not
sustainable for social media companies with enormous market capitalizations to
have so few employees when seeking to engage in content moderation on a global
scale. Henry Farrel, The New Economy’s Old Business Model is Dead, FOREIGN
POL’Y (July 13, 2018, 8:30 AM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/07/13/the-neweconomys-old-business-model-is-dead-automation-jobs-ai-technology/ (noting
pressures to regulate content online will force technology companies – which have
not been big job creators relative to other major companies – to hire significantly
more employees because algorithms are insufficient to deal with complex online
speech issues). See also SCOTT GALLOWAY, THE FOUR: THE HIDDEN DNA OF
AMAZON, APPLE, FACEBOOK, AND GOOGLE 266 (2017) (discussing the enormous
disparity between market capitalizations and job creation by the biggest tech
companies).
28
TARLETON GILLESPIE, CUSTODIANS OF THE INTERNET 9, 206–07 (Yale
University Press 2018).
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appropriate speech? Should company speech codes change based on
various national laws and customs? Should governments regulate
corporate content moderation?
The United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on the promotion
and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, an
independent expert appointed by UN member states who holds the top
position on freedom of expression within the UN’s human rights
machinery, proposed a way forward during his annual report to UN
member states in Geneva in June 2018. The Special Rapporteur
recommended that private companies re-align their speech codes with the
existing international human rights law regime. 29 He referred to social
media platforms as “enigmatic regulators” that were developing an
obscure type of “platform law.” 30 Determining what speech is acceptable
based on existing international human rights law, he argued, would give
companies a universal and principled basis to engage in content
moderation.31 His recommendation to ground private sector speech codes
in international standards was based on the 2011 UN Guiding Principles
on Business & Human Rights, which reflect global expectations for
companies to respect international human rights in their business
operations.32 In the wake of the Alex Jones controversy, Twitter’s CEO
tweeted that his company should root its values in international human
rights law33 and Facebook referenced human rights law in discussing its
content moderation policies.34
Does the UN expert’s recommendation to ground corporate
speech codes in human rights law provide a viable (and desirable) way
29

David Kaye (Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right
to freedom of opinion and expression), Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the
Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, ¶¶
3, 45, 70, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/38/35 (Apr. 6, 2018) [hereinafter SR Report]. A few
months earlier one of the leading international NGOs on freedom of expression
made a similar call for companies to ground their speech policies in the
international human rights regime. ARTICLE 19, SIDE-STEPPING RIGHTS:
REGULATING SPEECH BY CONTRACT 39 (2018), https://www.article19.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/06/Regulating-speech-by-contract-WEB-v2.pdf.
30
SR Report, supra note 29, ¶ 1.
31
Id. at ¶ 42.
32
See id. at ¶ 10 (“[T]he Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights
establish ‘global standard[s] of expected conduct’ that should apply throughout
company operations and whenever they operate.”).
33
Jack Dorsey (@jack), TWITTER (Aug. 10, 2018, 9:58 AM), https://twitter.com/
jack/status/1027962500438843397 [https://perma.cc/A297-PPMA].
34
Richard Allan , Hard Questions: Where Do We Draw the Line on Freedom of
Expression, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Aug. 9, 2018), https://newsroom.fb.com/
news/2018/08/hard-questions-free-expression/amp/?_twitter_impression=true
[https://perma.cc/Z5NP-ABEL] (“We look for guidance in documents like Article
19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which set
standards for when it’s appropriate to place restrictions on freedom of expression
. . . . The core concept here is whether a particular restriction of speech is
necessary to prevent harm. Short of that, the ICCPR holds that speech should be
allowed. This is the same test we use to draw the line on Facebook.”).
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forward on the issue of private sector content moderation? While much of
the discourse to date on content moderation has focused on increasing
corporate transparency measures and improving procedural protections for
users,35 this Article focuses on the normative question of the substantive
content of corporate speech codes applicable to user-generated content on
their platforms. In particular, this Article seeks to unpack what the call by
the UN Special Rapporteur to re-align these private sector speech rules
with international human rights law would mean as a practical matter for
social media companies. Part I of this Article provides background on
international human rights law’s protections for freedom of expression,
the UN Guiding Principles on Business & Human Rights, and the recent
report on content moderation by the UN’s free speech expert. Part II
examines what this call to re-align private sector speech rules would entail
by focusing on a particular platform’s hate speech code: the Twitter Rules.
This examination describes aspects of Twitter’s speech code that would
need to change as well as raises key questions that companies, scholars,
civil society, and policymakers will need to grapple with if social media
companies are to respect international human rights law standards. Part
III discusses potential criticisms and benefits of using international human
rights law as the default for content moderation. This Article concludes
that it is both feasible and desirable to ground corporate speech codes in
international human rights standards while noting that the road to this
desired goal, even if paved with good intentions, will be bumpy and will
require further multi-stakeholder input.

I. BACKGROUND ON RELEVANT UN STANDARDS
A. International Human Rights Law & Freedom of Expression
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
is the most relevant treaty on the topic of freedom of expression. 36 This
treaty, which was opened for signature in 1966, has 172 State Parties,

35

See, e.g., Cindy Cohn, Bad Facts Make Bad Law: How Platform Censorship
Has Failed So Far and How to Ensure that the Response to Neo-Nazi’s Doesn’t
Make it Worse, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 432, 447–50 (2018),
https://www.georgetownlawtechreview.org/bad-facts-make-bad-law-howplatform-censorship-has-failed-so-far-and-how-to-ensure-that-the-response-toneo-nazis-doesnt-make-it-worse/GLTR-07-2018/ (advocating for a variety of
procedural protections for platform users); JOHN BERGMAYER, EVEN UNDER KIND
MASTERS: A PROPOSAL TO REQUIRE THAT DOMINANT PLATFORMS ACCORD
THEIR
USERS DUE PROCESS, PUB. KNOWLEDGE, (May 2018),
https://www.publicknowledge.org/assets/uploads/blog/Even_Under_Kind_Mast
ers.pdf (arguing that dominant platforms should be expected to have procedures
and requirements respecting users’ due process); Emma Llanso, Is Holocaust
Denial Free Speech? Facebook Needs to be More Transparent, FORTUNE:
COMMENTARY (July 24, 2018), http://fortune.com/2018/07/24/facebook-markzuckerberg-holocaust-denial-free-speech/ (explaining that technology companies
should “focus on . . . transparency, a clear appeals process, and userempowerment tools” when removing online content).
36
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 19, ¶ 2, Dec. 16,
1966, S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
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including the United States. 37 ICCPR Article 19 protects the right to seek
and receive information of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, and through
any media.38 However, it also gives State Parties the discretion to restrict
expression if they can prove that each prong of a three-part test has been
met.39 Any restrictions on speech must be
1. “provided by law” (i.e., the restriction must provide
appropriate notice and must be properly promulgated)
and
2. “necessary” (i.e., the speech restriction must, among
other things, be the least intrusive means)
3. to achieve one of the listed public interest objectives
(i.e., protection of the reputations and rights of others,
national security, public order, public health or
morals).40
These three prongs are often referred to as the legality, necessity, and
legitimacy tests.41 In addition to meeting each prong of Article 19’s
tripartite test, any speech restriction must also be consistent with the
ICCPR’s many other provisions, including its ban on discrimination. 42

37

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UNITED NATIONS
TREATY C OLLECTION , https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=
TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&clang=_en (last visited Oct. 1, 2018)
[hereinafter UN Treaty Collection: ICCPR]. The United States became a party to
the ICCPR in 1992. Id.
38
ICCPR, supra note 36, at art. 19, ¶ 2.
39
Id. at art. 19, ¶ 3. The UN Human Rights Committee, the body of independent
experts who are elected by the treaty’s State Parties and charged with monitoring
implementation of the ICCPR, has issued its recommended interpretations of
Article 19 and made clear the burden of proving each prong of the tripartite test
rests on the State seeking to limit speech. U.N. Human Rights Comm., General
Comment No. 34, ¶ 35, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34 (Sept. 12, 2011) [hereinafter
GC 34].
40
ICCPR, supra note 36, at art. 19, ¶ 3. The interpretations of the tripartite test in
the text above come from the Human Rights Committee’s most recent guidance
on Article 19. See GC 34, supra note 39, ¶ 25–34 (discussing how to interpret the
ICCPR’s tripartite test for restrictions on speech). The U.S. Government has
interpreted the tripartite test similarly. See Freedom of Expression, 2011–12,
DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, Ch.6, §L(2), at
226–27 (explaining the U.S. Government’s view that “restrictions on expression
must be prescribed by laws that are accessible, clear, and subject to judicial
scrutiny; are necessary (e.g., the measures must be the least restrictive means for
protecting the governmental interest and are compatible with democratic
principles); and should be narrowly tailored to fulfill a legitimate government
purpose . . . .”).
41
See SR Report, supra note 29, ¶ 8. (noting that restrictions on free speech must
meet “the cumulative conditions of legality, necessity, and legitimacy.”).
42
The ICCPR prohibits discrimination in the implementation of treaty rights and
requires State Parties to guarantee equal protection of the law without
discrimination based on race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other
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ICCPR Article 20(2) contains a mandatory ban on “any advocacy
of national, racial, or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to
violence, discrimination, or hostility.” 43 This provision was highly
contentious during the ICCPR negotiations; the U.S. delegation (led by
Eleanor Roosevelt) and others advocated against it because it was vague
and open to misuse, but the Soviet Union mustered the votes to keep it in
the treaty.44 The scope of ICCPR Article 20 remains controversial to this
day. For example, a 2006 report by the UN High Commissioner on Human
Rights found that governments did not agree about the meaning of the key
terms in Article 20.45 The UN even took the extraordinary measure of
convening experts from around the world to propose an appropriate
interpretation of this contentious sentence,46 but this experts’ process has
not bridged the gap among governments with respect to Article 20’s
meaning. Regardless of the precise scope of Article 20, if a government
seeks to restrict speech under Article 20(2), that government continues to
bear the burden of surmounting the high bar set forth in Article 19’s
tripartite test, which significantly limits the potential reach of Article 20.47

opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, or other status. ICCPR, supra
note 36, at arts. 2, 26.
43
ICCPR, supra note 36, at art. 20, ¶ 2.
44
For a discussion of these negotiations, see Evelyn M. Aswad, To Ban or Not to
Ban Blasphemous Videos, 4 GEO. J. OF INT’L LAW, 1313, 1320–22 (2013). The
United States became a party to the ICCPR with a reservation to Article 20 that
states the article “does not authorize or require legislation or other action by the
United States that would restrict the right of free speech and association protected
by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” UN Treaty Collection: ICCPR,
supra note 37.
45
U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Incitement to Racial and Religious
Hatred and the Promotion of Tolerance, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/2/6 (Sept. 20.
2006) (finding states disagreed on the meaning of “incitement,” “hatred,” and
“hostility”).
46
U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Rep. on the Expert Workshops on
the Prohibition of Incitement to National, Racial or Religious Hatred, ¶ 1, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/22/17/A DD. 4 (Jan. 11, 2013).
47
See GC 34, supra note 39, ¶¶ 50–52. It should be noted that the UN Convention
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) prohibits spreading ideas
based on racial superiority or hatred as well as incitement to racial discrimination
and violence. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination art. 4, Dec. 21, 1965, S. Exec. Doc. C. 95-2 (1978), 660 U.N.T.S.
195. Any restrictions on speech imposed under this provision also must meet
ICCPR Article 19(3)’s tripartite test. See U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation No. 35, ¶¶ 8, 12, 19, U.N. Doc.
CERD/C/GC/35 (Sept. 26, 2013) (explaining that ICCPR Article 19(3)’s tripartite
test of legality, necessity, and legitimacy is incorporated into this convention).
The United States became a party to the CERD with the following reservation:
“That the Constitution and laws of the United States contain extensive protections
of individual freedom of speech, expression and association. Accordingly, the
United States does not accept any obligation under this Convention, in particular
under articles 4 and 7, to restrict those rights, through the adoption of legislation
or any other measures, to the extent that they are protected by the Constitution
and laws of the United States.” International Convention on the Elimination of
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B. The UN Guiding Principles on Business & Human Rights
1. General Background
As transnational corporate actors gained enormous power and
wealth, their adverse impacts on human rights began to spark discussions
at the United Nations. The debate involved whether the international
human rights regime (which generally focuses on state action) could or
should apply to such non-state actors. A group of independent experts
tasked with making recommendations on this topic essentially proposed
applying the existing human rights regime directly to companies in a 2003
document commonly referred to as “the Norms.” 48 This approach was
rejected by UN member states in 2004 and was generally criticized by the
business community. 49 The following year, the UN Secretary General
appointed a Special Representative on Human Rights and Transnational
Corporations and Other Enterprises (Harvard professor John Ruggie) to
try to resolve the complex issue of the appropriate relationship of
international human rights law with respect to corporate actors.50
For six years, Professor Ruggie held numerous consultations
throughout the world with stakeholders from business, civil society,
indigenous groups, and UN member states. 51 He rejected the approach set
forth in the Norms.52 In 2011, he proposed to the UN Human Rights
Council an alternative approach known as the Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights (the UNGPs), which were unanimously
endorsed by the Council (including the United States).53 The U.S.
Government subsequently encouraged American companies to implement
the UNGPs and to treat them as a floor rather than a ceiling in their
operations.54
All Forms of Racial Discrimination, UNITED N ATIONS TREATY C OLLECTION ,
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV2&chapter=4&clang=_en (last visited Aug. 12, 2018).
48
PHILIP ALSTON & RYAN GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, 1471–
72 (2d ed. 2012).
49
Id. at 1477.
50
Id. at 1477–78.
51
Id. at 1478–79.
52
See id. (Ruggie decided that the Norms were flawed because, among other
things, they stated corporations were already bound by international human rights
instruments, which he found had “little authoritative basis in international law.”).
53
Human Rights Council Res. 17/4, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/17/4 (July 6, 2011);
John Ruggie, Rep. of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the
issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business
enterprises to the Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21,
2011) [hereinafter UNGPs].
54
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, H. R. AND LAB., U.S.
GOVERNMENT APPROACH ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 4 (2013),
https://photos.state.gov/libraries/korea/49271/july_2013/dwoa_USG-Approachon-Business-and-Human-Rights-updatedJune2013.pdf; U.S. GOVERNMENT,
RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS CONDUCT: FIRST NATIONAL ACTION PLAN FOR THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 17 (2016), https://www.state.gov/e/eb/eppd/
csr/naprbc/265706.htm.
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The UNGPs embody the international community’s expectations
for how companies should act when facing human rights issues in the
course of their business operations. In a nutshell, the UNGPs specify that
companies should “respect” human rights, which means companies
“should avoid infringing on the human rights of others and should address
adverse human rights impacts with which they are involved.” 55 Thus,
while companies do not have all of the same human rights obligations as
states do under international human rights law, corporate actors are
expected to avoid adversely impacting the enjoyment of human rights and
to provide remedies if rights are undermined. The UNGPs define “human
rights” according to international instruments (including the ICCPR)
rather than regional ones,56 which can be less protective of human rights.57
The UNGPs expect companies to, among other things, develop human
rights policies, actively engage with external stakeholders in assessing
human rights challenges, conduct due diligence to assess potential risks to
human rights, and develop strategies to avoid infringing on rights.58
Where national law conflicts with international human rights law
standards, companies should seek ways to avoid infringing on human
rights, but ultimately should comply with local law and address any
adverse impacts.59 The UNGPs apply to all companies regardless of size,
but “the scale and complexity of the means through which enterprises meet
that responsibility may vary.” 60 This provides some measure of flexibility
in their implementation.
2. The UNGPs in the Context of Social Media Companies
Freedom of expression represents one of the most salient human
rights issues that intersects with the business operations of social media
companies.61 For social media companies to implement the UNGPs, they
need to understand the scope of the right to freedom of expression under
international human rights law. Additionally, social media companies
should assess the risk of potential infringements on expression that occur
during their business operations. Such infringements frequently happen
in two ways: (1) by cooperating with governmental demands that do not
meet international human rights law standards (e.g., governmental
55

UNGPs, supra note 53, at Principle 11.
Id. at Principle 12 (emphasizing that business enterprises should respect
internationally recognized human rights).
57
See infra notes 90–93 and accompanying text.
58
UNGPs, supra note 53, at Principles 13–21.
59
Id. at Principle 23 and accompanying commentary.
60
Id. at Principle 14 and accompanying commentary (“The means through which
a business enterprise meets its responsibility to respect human rights will be
proportional to, among other factors, its size. Small and medium-sized enterprises
may have less capacity as well as more informal processes and management
structures than larger companies, so their respective policies and processes will
take on different forms.”). This Article focuses on the largest American social
media platforms.
61
There are other salient human rights issues that often come up in the context of
social media companies (e.g., privacy), but this section focuses on expression
given the overall nature and scope of this Article.
56
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demands to remove speech critical of the head of state) and (2) by
imposing their own corporate speech codes on user-generated content that
restrict speech otherwise protected under international human rights law.
Although most companies do not ground their internal speech
codes in international human rights law, 62 several large social media
companies have already been quite active in seeking to implement the
UNGPs when they face governmental demands that do not meet
international human rights law standards. For example, the Global
Network Initiative (GNI) involves a multi-stakeholder collaboration
among companies (such as Google, Facebook, and Microsoft), investors,
civil society, and academics to provide guidance about respecting freedom
of expression in line with international standards. 63 GNI companies are
expected to understand the scope of international freedom of expression
standards and assess whether governmental demands to restrict speech
comport with ICCPR Article 19 and its tripartite test (e.g., are restrictions
on speech vague or not properly promulgated, are the least intrusive means
used, and are regulations imposed for legitimate public interest
reasons?).64 If governmental laws or orders fail the tripartite test, GNI
companies are expected to resist implementing the government’s demand
to the extent possible before complying with local law.65 GNI companies
may resist by, inter alia, initiating lawsuits in local courts and asking for
the assistance of other governments or the UN’s human rights
machinery.66 The GNI’s assessment mechanism has consistently found
that participating companies have been implementing their
commitments.67
3. What about the Free Expression Rights of Social Media Companies?
A question that frequently arises in this context is whether
expecting companies to align their internal speech codes with international
human rights law violates their corporate free speech rights. While
corporations have free speech rights under U.S. domestic law,68
international human rights law protections extend only to natural persons
and not to legal persons. The ICCPR provides that each State Party must
respect and ensure “to all individuals within its territory and subject to its

62

SR Report, supra note 29, ¶¶ 10, 24. Since the report was issued, Twitter and
Facebook have expressed openness towards turning to international human rights
law in regulating speech. See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text.
63
GLOBAL NETWORK INITIATIVE, https://globalnetworkinitiative.org/ (last visited
July 26, 2018). This initiative also covers privacy issues. Id.
64
GNI Principles, GLOBAL NETWORK INITIATIVE, https://globalnetworkinitiative.
org/gni-principles/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2018).
65
Implementation Guidelines, GLOBAL NETWORK INITIATIVE, https://globalnet
workinitiative.org/implementation-guidelines/ (last visited July 30, 2018).
66
Id.
67
Company Assessments, GLOBAL NETWORK INITIATIVE, https://globalnetwork
initiative.org/company-assessments/ (last visited July 30, 2018).
68
See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n., 558 U.S. 310, 342–45
(2010).
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jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant.” 69 The UN
Human Rights Committee, the body of independent experts charged with
monitoring implementation of the ICCPR and recommending
interpretations of the text, has stated that only individuals (and not
corporate entities) are holders of rights. 70 International law scholars have
likewise taken this position. 71 Thus, requiring social media platforms to
have speech codes based on international human rights law standards
would not necessarily violate the speech rights of corporations under
international human rights law as they do not hold such rights. That said,
the UNGPs are not a legally binding framework and the U.S. government
has only encouraged, not mandated, their implementation.72 If an
American platform chooses not to respect international human rights in
the content and enforcement of its speech code, it would not necessarily
violate international or U.S. law, but it would be acting inconsistently with
the global expectations embodied in the UNGPs.

C. The UN Special Rapporteur’s Report
In June 2018, the UN Special Rapporteur presented his annual
report to the Human Rights Council in which he recommended “a
framework for the moderation of user-generated online content that puts
human rights at the very centre.”73 The report called on companies to align
their content moderation policies with international human rights law and,
in doing so, cited to the UNGPs.74 In particular, the Special Rapporteur
called on companies to align the substance of their speech codes with
ICCPR Article 19(3)’s tripartite test of legality, necessity, and
legitimacy.75 He noted few Internet “companies apply human rights
69

ICCPR, supra note 36, at art. 2, ¶ 1 (emphasis added). From a plain language
reading, it is important that this treaty uses the word “individuals” rather than
“persons,” which indicates the treaty rights pertain to natural persons rather than
legal persons.
70
U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 31, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13 (May 26, 2004).
71
See, e.g., Thomas Burgenthal, To Respect and To Ensure, State Obligations and
Permissible Derogations, in THE INT’L BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL
AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 73 (Louis Henkin ed. 1981) (“Juridical persons enjoy no
rights under the covenant.”).
72
See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
73
SR Report, supra note 29, ¶ 2.
74
See id. at ¶¶ 10, 45, 70. Access Now and the Electronic Frontier Foundation,
which are leading NGOs that are involved in issues of freedom of expression
online, have also reaffirmed this call. See Access Now (@accessnow), TWITTER
(Aug.
13,
2018,
5:46
PM),
https://twitter.com/
accessnow/status/1029167419888214016
[https://perma.cc/RK72-W927];
Electronic Frontier Foundation (@EFF), TWITTER (Aug. 13, 2018, 5:29 PM),
https://twitter.com/EFF/status/1029162979453886464
[https://perma.cc/QZ4T-P2RX].
75
See SR Report, supra note 29, ¶¶ 45–47. It should be noted that the UN expert
on countering terrorism while respecting human rights has also criticized
Facebook for using overly broad and vague language on terrorist content in its
community guidelines and called on the company to align its speech code with
international human rights law. Isa Qasim, Exclusive: U.N. Human Rights Experts
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principles in their operations, and most that do see them as limited to how
they respond to government threats and demands.” 76 The report noted it
would be in the companies’ interests to align their internal speech codes
with international human rights law because their speech codes would be
grounded in universally agreed principles.77 Rather than defending their
“homegrown” versions of the appropriate parameters on worldwide
speech, companies would be on firmer ground in discussions with
governments (which often want them to censor too much speech) if their
speech codes were aligned with international human rights protections.78
The report also called for companies to implement a variety of improved
transparency and procedural safeguards.79

II. ALIGNING CORPORATE SPEECH CODES WITH INTERNATIONAL
STANDARDS
Currently, each social media company has its own policies about
what types of speech are unacceptable on its platform.80 As Gillespie notes
in his overview of corporate speech codes, these policies often display a
fundamental tension between a corporate reluctance to intervene and “a
fear of not intervening,”81 with “a range of registers on display: fussy
schoolteacher, stern parent, committed fellow artist, easygoing friend.”82
In order to explore in a concrete way what re-aligning corporate speech
codes to be consistent with the UNGPs and international human rights law
would entail, this section examines the general approach to speech by one
large social media company, Twitter. This section also analyzes Twitter’s
particular rules on hate speech to determine what, if anything, would need
to change in such a re-alignment.83 The analysis concludes that Twitter
Meet with Facebook on “Overly Broad” Definitions of Terrorist Content, JUST
SECURITY (Sept. 3, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/60554/exclusive-u-nrapporteur-facebook-fight-terrorist-content-risks-ensnaring/.
76
SR Report, supra note 29, ¶ 10.
77
Id. at ¶¶ 42–43, 70.
78
Id. at ¶ 42.
79
For example, the Special Rapporteur called for “radically different approaches
to transparency at all stages” include sharing “case law” that shows how
companies apply their speech codes. Id. at ¶ 71. The Special Rapporteur
recommended increased disclosure of trends in decision making and called for
companies to provide appeal processes and remedies for infringements on speech.
Id. at ¶¶ 47, 58, 72. He noted that creating “social media councils” to hear
complaints and rectify speech infringements could provide a scalable way
forward. Id. at ¶ 58. He also recommended that companies subject themselves to
some form of public accountability, potentially through the creation of “industrywide accountability mechanisms[.]” Id. at ¶ 72.
80
GILLESPIE, supra note 28, at 45–73.
81
Id. at 50.
82
Id. at 48.
83
Twitter’s speech code also covers a variety of topics beyond hate speech,
including intellectual property issues, graphic violence and adult content, threats
of violence, and the promotion of self-harm. See The Twitter Rules, TWITTER,
https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/twitter-rules
[https://perma.cc/NXA3-2H4F]. This section is limited to consideration of
Twitter’s hate speech rules in order to provide a focused exposition of the analysis
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would need to make substantial revisions to its rules in order to align them
with international standards, and that even a good faith attempt at such realignment would leave some key issues open for additional discussion.

A. Twitter’s General Approach to Online Speech
Twitter states that protecting users’ freedom of expression is one
of its core values.84 The underpinnings of its general philosophy on speech
are as follows:
while grounded in the United States Bill of Rights and
the European Convention on Human Rights, [Twitter’s
approach] is informed by a number of additional sources
including the members of our Trust and Safety Council,
relationships with advocates and activists around the globe, and
by works such as [the] United Nations Principles on Business
and Human Rights. 85

Unfortunately, this foundational statement is both internally inconsistent
and departs from the UNGPs. To begin with, it says Twitter’s approach
to freedom of expression is “grounded” in the U.S. Bill of Rights,
presumably the First Amendment in particular, as well as the European
Convention on Human Rights. This statement is internally inconsistent
because the interpretations of free speech under the First Amendment and
under the European Convention on Human Rights are often in conflict.
For example, the European Court of Human Rights has upheld the banning
of a blasphemous film86 while the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled
blasphemy bans unconstitutional. 87 Similarly, under U.S. law, denials of
historic atrocities as well as hate speech are generally permissible as long
as there is no advocacy of incitement to imminent violence or a true threat
of harm.88 The European Court of Human Rights, on the other hand, has
often upheld bans on hateful speech as well as denial of historic atrocities

and revisions that would be needed when a social media company seeks to
compare provisions in its speech code with international human rights law. This
section discusses The Twitter Rules as they existed on August 31, 2018.
84
Defending and Respecting the Rights of People Using Our Service, TWITTER,
https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/defending-and-respecting-ourusers-voice [https://perma.cc/75W3-GHD7]. Although Twitter’s core values and
approach also encompass privacy, this section focuses on the expression aspects
given the scope of this Article.
85
Id.
86
Otto-Preminger-Institute v. Austria, 295 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶¶ 51–57 (1994).
The European Court of Human Rights continues to highlight this 1994 case as
good law in its religious freedom overview on its website. EUROPEAN COURT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS, RESEARCH DIV., OVERVIEW OF THE COURT’S CASE-LAW ON
FREEDOM OF RELIGION
20
(2013),
http://echr.coe.int/Documents/
Research_report_religion_ENG.pdf.
87
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 506 (1952).
88
Erik Bleich, Freedom of Expression Versus Racist Hate Speech: Explaining
Differences Between High Court Regulations in the USA and Europe, 40 J. OF
ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD. 283, 283–84 (2014).
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without a showing of likely lawless action in the near to midterm.89 Given
such significant divergences between American and European approaches
to speech, it is unclear how Twitter’s philosophy on freedom of expression
can be grounded in both jurisprudential sources.
Moreover, this statement of foundational principles departs from
the UNGPs, which provide that companies should seek to align their
operations with international human rights law rather than domestic laws
(like the U.S. Bill of Rights) or regional law (such as the European Human
Rights Convention). Regional human rights law often departs from
international law with regard to freedom of expression. For example,
while the European Court of Human Rights has upheld blasphemy bans,90
the UN Human Rights Committee, which recommends interpretations of
the ICCPR, has generally condemned bans on blasphemous speech.91
Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights has upheld criminal bans
on speech that denies historic atrocities,92 whereas the UN Human Rights
Committee has disapproved of such censorship.93 In sum, regional human
rights instruments (and monitoring bodies) are not international human
rights instruments (and monitoring bodies). Thus, the scope of protection
afforded under each may differ. As a statement of global expectations, the
UNGPs are properly pinned to international instruments and not regional
instruments, unlike Twitter’s general philosophy on speech.
It should also be noted that, by selectively highlighting one
region’s human rights convention (i.e. Europe), Twitter opens itself up to
claims from countries in other regions that their own regional human rights
instruments should be used to evaluate speech uploaded or viewed in their
parts of the world. Those regional instruments can also depart from the
ICCPR and provide fewer protections. For example, the Human Rights
Declaration of the Association of South East Asian Nations 94 (ASEAN)
limits rights, including freedom of expression, in a variety of ways that are
inconsistent with international standards. 95 The Organization of Islamic
Id. See also Noah Feldman, Free Speech in Europe Isn’t What Americans Think,
BLOOMBERG: VIEW (Mar. 19, 2017, 9:33 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/
view/articles/2017-03-19/free-speech-in-europe-isn-t-what-americans-think.
90
Otto-Preminger-Institute, 295 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶¶ 51–57.
91
GC 34, supra note 39, ¶ 48 (“Prohibitions of displays of lack of respect for a
religion or other belief system, including blasphemy laws, are incompatible with
the Covenant, except in the specific circumstances envisaged in article 20,
paragraph 2, of the Covenant.”).
92
Bleich, supra note 88, at 283–84.
93
GC 34, supra note 39, ¶ 49 (“Laws that penalize the expression of opinions
about historical facts are incompatible with the obligations that the Covenant
imposes on States parties in relation to the respect for freedom of opinion and
expression. The Covenant does not permit general prohibition of expressions of
an erroneous opinion or an incorrect interpretation of past events.”).
94
ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN
STATES (Nov. 19, 2012), http://asean.org/asean-human-rights-declaration/.
95
The ASEAN Declaration’s inappropriate limitations on rights include “the use
of the concept of ‘cultural relativism’ to suggest that rights in the [Universal
Declaration on Human Rights] do not apply everywhere; stipulating that domestic
89
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Cooperation, which is comprised of 57 nations, 96 has formed a human
rights system. This system is based in part on the Cairo Declaration on
Human Rights in Islam, which explicitly limits free speech according to
Shariah norms.97 What basis does Twitter have for favoring (or applying)
Europe’s regional approach to human rights in its global operations over
other regions’ human rights instruments? It is only by citing to universal
standards embodied in international human rights law that Twitter can
claim to ground its worldwide rules in a fair manner.
If Twitter were to heed the UN Special Rapporteur’s call to act
consistently with the UNGPs, the company would need to revise the
general philosophy underlying its speech code by making at least two key
changes. First, rather than highlighting any particular domestic laws or
regional human rights instruments, the philosophical statement should
reference a commitment to aligning its approach to speech with
international human rights law and ICCPR Article 19 in particular.
Second, Twitter’s approach should not be “informed” by the UNGPs, but
rather it should clearly commit to “implementing” the UNGPs. Such
fundamental revisions in its basic philosophy would result in a shift with
respect to the substance and execution of its speech code and warrant
appropriate training to mainstream a new approach grounded in
international human rights law.

B. Twitter’s Approach to Hate Speech
Twitter’s hate speech provisions appear under the “hateful
conduct” and “hateful imagery and display names” headings of its speech
code.98 With respect to hateful conduct, users may not promote “violence
against, threaten, or harass other people on the basis of race, ethnicity,
national origin, sexual orientation, gender, gender identity, religious
affiliation, age, disability, or serious disease.”99 Prohibited hate speech is
further defined as, among other things, speech that harasses by wishing for
harm of individuals or groups, inciting fear of a protected group, and
repeating content that degrades someone. 100 Decisions about whether
laws can trump universal human rights; incomplete descriptions of rights that are
memorialized elsewhere; introducing novel limits to rights; and language that
could be read to suggest that individual rights are subject to group veto.” Press
Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, ASEAN Declaration on Human Rights Press
Statement
(Nov.
20,
2012),
https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/
2012/11/200915.htm.
96
Member States, ORGANISATION OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION, https://www.oicoci.org/states/?lan=en (last visited Aug. 10, 2018).
97
The Organisation of the Islamic Cooperation, The Cairo Declaration on Human
Rights in Islam art. 22, Aug. 5, 1990, Annex to Res. No. 49/19-P, available at
https://www.oic-iphrc.org/en/data/docs/legal_instruments/OIC_HRRIT/
571230.pdf.
98
TWITTER, supra note 83. Other forms of abusive speech are also covered by
Twitter’s rules, but the focus of this Article is on the company’s hateful conduct,
hateful imagery, and hateful display policies.
99
Id.
100
Hateful Conduct Policy, TWITTER: HELP CENTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/
rules-and-policies/hateful-conduct-policy [https://perma.cc/LU63-AVTP].
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violations have occurred are made by referring to context, including
discussions with aggrieved persons. 101 Users are also prohibited from
using “hateful images or symbols in [their] profile image or profile header”
as well as using their “username, display name, or profile bio to engage in
abusive behavior, such as targeted harassment or expressing hate towards
a person, group, or protected category.” 102
There are a variety of consequences for violations. For example,
Twitter can make tweets less visible in several ways, including with
respect to search results. 103 Twitter can also prevent rule violators from
tweeting again until they delete tweets that cross the line and can hide the
tweets until they are deleted. 104 If a profile is non-compliant, Twitter can
make it unavailable until it is changed. 105 An account can also be placed
in “read only” mode, limiting the violator’s ability to tweet, retweet, or
like content.106 Twitter’s most severe penalty is permanent account
suspension, which removes the account from view (and violators are
prohibited from creating new Twitter accounts).107 The type of reprimand
is based on a variety of factors, including the severity of the violation, the
user’s track record of behavior on Twitter, and whether the topic may be
of legitimate public interest.108
1. Is Twitter’s Hate Speech Ban Vague?
As discussed in Part I, for any restriction on speech to be valid
under the ICCPR, the restriction must be (1) “provided by law” (e.g., not
vague) and (2) “necessary” (e.g., the least intrusive means) (3) to achieve
a legitimate aim.109 If we apply the ICCPR’s tripartite test in the context
of Twitter’s hate speech rules, it is clear that aspects of Twitter’s rules
would need revision, particularly with respect to the requirement that
speech restrictions not be vague (as many terms in Twitter’s hate speech
ban are unclear). For example, what is the scope of speech that constitutes
“expressing hate” towards someone or a group? What range of speech
“degrades” someone? Which images would meet the “hateful” threshold?
The UN Special Rapporteur found, as a general matter, that “[c]ompany
policies on hate, harassment, and abuse also do not clearly indicate what
constitutes an offence,” and he highlighted, in particular, Twitter’s
prohibition on speech that “incites fear about a protected group” as

101

Id.
TWITTER, supra note 83.
103
Our Range of Enforcement Options, TWITTER: HELP CENTER,
https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/enforcement-options
[https://perma.cc/F6VD-E7X3].
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
Our Approach to Policy Development and Enforcement Philosophy, TWITTER,
https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/enforcement-philosophy
[https://perma.cc/89KT-DJ9A].
109
See supra notes 36–47 and accompanying text.
102
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subjective and vague.110 Twitter would need to revise its hate speech rules
to address a variety of vagueness issues to pass the “legality” prong of the
ICCPR’s tripartite test. 111
2. Do Twitter’s Hate Speech Rules Constitute the “Least Intrusive
Means?”
While the UN Special Rapporteur’s report provided some tangible
guidance on what it would look like for companies to respect the first
prong of ICCPR Article 19(3)’s tripartite test,112 his commentary does not
address details of how a company would apply the second or third prongs
of Article 19(3) in its operations.113 A company may consider approaching
Article 19(3)’s second prong (i.e., the “necessity” or “least intrusive
means” test) by drawing on lessons learned from governments’
experiences. This section reviews some of those experiences and proposes
a company would need, at a minimum, to publicly commit to three steps
to act consistently with the “necessity” prong of the tripartite test. First, a
company should evaluate the means at its disposal to achieve a legitimate
aim without infringing on speech. Second, in assessing various options
that infringe on speech, a company should select the option that reflects
the least intrusion on speech interests. Third, the company should
periodically assess whether the selected measure helps to achieve the
legitimate aim or not. Each step involves an analysis that differs from—
but can be usefully informed by—how governmental actors are expected
to analyze these issues.
Turning to the first step, what are the types of options available to
companies to achieve legitimate aims that do not involve infringing on
110

SR Report, supra note 29, ¶ 26. The Special Rapporteur is not alone in his
concern that company speech codes are vague. During a Congressional hearing in
September 2018, Twitter’s CEO acknowledged “if you were to go to our rules
today and sit down with a cup of coffee, you would not be able to understand
them.” Manjoo, supra note 25. (Perhaps the best example of the vagueness issues
with the Twitter Rules is that the company initially felt Alex Jones had not
violated its speech code, then determined he merited a temporary suspension, and
then de-platformed him. See supra note 23 and infra note 141.) It should also be
noted that, under the ICCPR, any speech restrictions must also comply with the
treaty’s other protections, including its ban on discrimination. Article 26 of the
ICCPR provides equal protection for a wide array of groups. ICCPR, supra note
36, at art. 26. Twitter’s list of protected groups is not as broad as the ICCPR’s list
of groups because the company’s list does not, for example, cover political
groups. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
111
Corporations have an incentive to keep their speech codes vague because it
helps them take the position they are correct in whatever enforcement action they
choose to implement. That said, if a company pledges to respect Article 19(3) in
its speech code, it would be possible for civil society and users to assess if the
company has overcome its inclinations or has maintained vague speech codes.
112
SR Report, supra note 29, ¶¶ 26–27, 46 (discussing vagueness problems with
company speech codes).
113
Id. at ¶¶ 28, 47 (calling for increased transparency when discussing the second
prong of the tripartite test rather than providing granular guidance for
implementation).

No. 1]

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

48

speech, including deleting speech or blocking speakers from their
platforms? To answer this question in the context of corporate actors, it is
instructive to examine the toolkit that the international community has
agreed governments should use to fight religious hatred and intolerance.
For over ten years at the United Nations, countries fought about whether
it was necessary to ban blasphemy, speech that embodies religious hatred,
or speech that otherwise greatly offends religious sensibilities to promote
religious tolerance.114 Some nations argued it was necessary to ban such
speech not only to promote tolerance, but also for individuals to feel
comfortable to practice their religious beliefs and to feel safe in society.
In 2011, the international community ultimately determined in
UN Human Rights Council Resolution 16/18 that governments have a host
of options short of broad bans on speech to end religious hatred and
promote tolerance.115
These options include promoting relevant
educational initiatives and inter-faith dialogues, training government
employees in effective outreach strategies to vulnerable groups,
encouraging government officials to speak out against intolerance, and
robustly implementing discrimination and hate crimes laws (i.e.,
punishing discriminatory behavior as a way of preventing potential
harmful impacts of intolerant speech).116 This resolution only calls for a
ban on speech when there is incitement to imminent violence, which
reflects the U.S. constitutional standard for banning speech that incites
harm.117 This set of proactive good governance actions, short of broad
speech bans, is often referred to as the “16/18 consensus toolkit.”118 Under
this rubric, it would be inappropriate for a government to resort to banning
offensive speech to promote religious tolerance if the government had not
even tried to engage in the basic good governance measures set forth in
the 16/18 toolkit. In other words, resorting to speech bans without
engaging in good governance measures would not constitute the “least
intrusive means” to achieving religious tolerance and public order.
When considering what options companies should consider before
infringing on speech in situations involving, among other things, online
hatred and intolerance, it is helpful to keep this 16/18 toolkit in mind. Like
governments, companies can also speak out on issues, educate users, and
promote dialogue on contentious issues. It seems that companies have
already been implementing some activities similar to those in the 16/18
toolkit to help them tackle several pressing issues. For example, Facebook
has been funding a variety of dialogue and counter-narrative approaches
to combatting hate and violent extremism. 119 Google has been funding
114

Aswad, supra note 44, at 1323.
Human Rights Council Res. 16/18, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/16/18 (Apr. 12,
2011) [hereinafter Council Res. 16/18].
116
Id. at ¶¶ 5–6.
117
Aswad, supra note 44, at 1325.
118
Id. at 1328.
119
See, e.g., Jeremy Kahn, How Facebook Can Fight the Hate, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (May 25, 2017, 4:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/features/2017-05-25/how-facebook-can-fight-the-hate (discussing specific
115
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educational initiatives on media literacy to help combat misinformation
online.120 Like governments, companies can and should be creative and
proactive in developing actions inspired by the 16/18 toolkit that can help
resolve issues without infringing on speech on their platforms. As noted
previously, the UNGPs provide a measure of flexibility in their
implementation based on the size and resources of a company, which will
be of particular relevance for smaller social media companies in
developing appropriate toolkits. 121
After implementing available “good governance” measures,
companies should consider the second step noted above to act consistently
with Article 19(3)’s necessity test. When a company must resort to
infringing on speech, it should carefully develop a continuum of options
for dealing with problematic speech and commit publicly to selecting the
least intrusive means to resolve the problem. In the context of
governments, the least intrusive means test often involves, for example,
selecting civil rather than criminal sanctions for harmful speech.122 For
private platforms, there are a range of actions to be considered. For
example, a company could give its users a means to opt out of offensive
material.123 Another option could be that a company avoids giving
problematic posts a circulation boost, but does not delete them or affect its
users’ ability to circulate the posts.124 A company could also lower the
ranking of problematic posts in search results or otherwise decrease their
visibility.125 Although options involving de-emphasizing posts would not
counter-narrative measures to combat extremism online that are funded by
Facebook).
120
See Kevin Roose, Google Pledges $300 Million to Clean Up False News, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/20/business/
media/google-false-news.html (reporting Google promised $10 million to help
teenagers identify misinformation).
121
See supra text accompanying note 60.
122
For instance, the UN Human Rights Committee has advised State Parties to the
ICCPR to avoid criminal sanctions in the context of defamation suits. GC 34,
supra note 39, ¶ 47.
123
See, e.g., Cohn, supra note 35, at 451 (arguing Facebook gives users the ability
to choose the types of ads they prefer and could develop “a similar system” so
users could avoid offensive content rather than Facebook banning the content);
Llansó, supra note 35 (proposing alternatives to banning speech such as
“involving members of the site’s community in administering and
moderating subsections based on those sections’ own norms and policies,
or allowing individual users to set their own filters and rules for what they
can see and share on the site.”).
124
Facebook, for instance, has stated it will not remove Holocaust denial posts,
but will not give them a circulation boost in its News Feed. Swisher, supra note
11.
125
After President Trump accused Twitter of “shadow banning” Republican
tweets, Twitter released a statement explaining it does not shadow ban (which it
defined as making tweets “undiscoverable to everyone except to the person who
posted it”) and explained it ranks search results by boosting those tweets that are
relevant to users and popular and de-emphasizing tweets “from bad-faith actors
who intend to manipulate or divide the conversation” in order to promote a
“healthy conversation.” Vijaya Gadde & Kayvon Beykpour, Setting the Record

No. 1]

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

50

delete them from the platforms, this analysis treats them as an
infringement on speech as such techniques could have the effect of
essentially burying posts. 126 Where speech must be banned, geo-blocking
(i.e., restricting access to Internet content based on location) a particular
post from view in the particular country could be considered (rather than
removing the information from the platform).127 A more intrusive
infringement on speech on this continuum would be to delete a post but to
allow the speaker to continue to speak on the platform. 128 Warnings could
be issued to a user who repeatedly violates a company’s speech code
before taking more severe measures. The most extreme end of the
continuum may be blocking a user’s account in egregious situations.129 In

Straight
on
Shadow
Banning,
TWITTER
(July
26,
2018),
https://blog.twitter.com/official/en_us/topics/company/2018/Setting-the-recordstraight-on-shadow-banning.html. Twitter’s speech code also specifies that its
range of enforcement actions include making a tweet less visible based on various
factors, including the “quality of the content.” Our Range of Enforcement Actions,
supra note 103. Google has also redirected search results to help counter violent
extremism. Kahn, supra note 119.
126
See Tessa Lyons, Replacing Disputed Flags with Related Articles, FACEBOOK
NEWSROOM (Dec. 20, 2017), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/12/news-feedfyi-updates-in-our-fight-against-misinformation/ (“Demoting false news (as
identified by fact-checkers) is one of our best weapons because demoted articles
typically lose 80 percent of their traffic.”). Very little is known about how
companies engage in such practices that de-emphasize information on their
platforms. The need for greater clarity and transparency about how companies
affect discourse through ranking information on their platforms continues to be a
crucial aspect of understanding how they regulate – and affect – speech and
therefore of assessing the extent to which such measures infringe on speech
relative to other measures.
127
For example, it may be the case that geo-blocking advocacy to incitement to
imminent violence in a particular country could help avoid an atrocity in that
country, but allowing those outside the country to view the speech could help
formulate responses by the international community, including gathering
evidence for accountability purposes.
128
Given the global scale at which many social media companies operate, there
may be a temptation to rely too much on automated methods to delete speech that
violate speech codes (as appears to have occurred when Facebook deleted the post
containing parts of the Declaration of Independence). As noted in a report by the
Center for Democracy and Technology, it is wrong to “assume that automated
technology can accomplish on a large scale the kind of nuanced analysis that
humans can accomplish on a small scale.” CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH.,
MIXED MESSAGES? THE LIMITS OF AUTOMATED SOC. MEDIA CONTENT ANALYSIS
3 (Nov. 2017), https://cdt.org/files/2017/11/Mixed-Messages-Paper.pdf. Relying
solely on automated technology is likely to delete too much speech and thus be
inconsistent with the least intrusive means test.
129
For example, Twitter’s rules note that the company’s most severe enforcement
action is permanent account suspension. Our Range of Enforcement Options,
supra note 103. Getting kicked off a major platform has been referred to as the
“death penalty” in the digital world. See Will Sommer, YouTube Bans Infowars’
Alex Jones from Spewing Hate Speech, DAILY BEAST (Aug. 6, 2018, 12:06 PM),
https://www.thedailybeast.com/youtube-bans-infowarss-alex-jones-for-spewing-
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sum, a variety of corporate options exist that infringe on speech to varying
degrees, and a company bears the burden of proving it has selected the
least intrusive means in acting consistently with ICCPR Article 19(3).130
Finally, the third step a company should undertake regarding the
“necessity” test is diligently monitoring whether the measure it has
selected is helping to further a legitimate aim. To illustrate, if a company
deletes posts or bans users from its platform, it needs to assess if that is
helping create communities that are, for example, resilient to
radicalization, knowledgeable about misinformation online, and
tolerant.131 Similarly, a company needs to consider whether such measures
cause harmful speech to fester on smaller platforms and what impact that
is having on the legitimate aim.132 A company should assess whether its
selected measures have negative unintended consequences 133 that may
outweigh the desired benefits and whether such measures unproductively
hate-speech (“In recent weeks, Facebook, Apple, and Spotify had banned
Infowars, but YouTube had seemed reluctant to impose the death penalty.”)
130
This section does not comprise a comprehensive listing of options. For
additional options, see Mike Masnick, Platforms, Speech, and Truth: Policy,
Policing and Impossible Choices, TECHDIRT (Aug. 9, 2018, 9:42 AM),
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20180808/17090940397/platforms-speechtruth-policy-policing-impossible-choices.shtml. Another potential option to be
considered could involve time-limited content blocking when there are substantial
risks about immediate violence that would not trigger the same concerns after a
particular situation is diffused.
131
Companies have shown an understanding of monitoring whether their selected
approaches work or not. For instance, when Facebook found that “flagging”
misinformation was not helpful in combatting misinformation, it switched to
circulating related articles to give context to misinformation to better combat it.
Lyons, supra note 126.
132
See Joanna Plucinska, Hate Speech Thrives Underground, POLITICO (Feb. 7,
2018, 12:12 PM), https://www.politico.eu/article/hate-speech-and-terroristcontent-proliferate-on-web-beyond-eu-reach-experts/ (reporting that “with
increased scrutiny on mainstream sites, alt-right and terrorist sympathizers are
flocking to niche platforms where illegal content is shared freely, security experts
and anti-extremism activists say.”); see also Jessica Schulberg et al., The NeoNazis Are Back Online, HUFF. POST (Oct. 3, 2017, 9:43 PM),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/nazis-are-backonline_us_59d40719e4b06226e3f46941 (describing how Stormfront, a neo-Nazi
internet forum, was able to transfer its domain name from one domain registrar to
another after being shut down).
133
See, e.g., Rob Price, YouTube’s Crackdown on Extremist Content and ISIS is
also Hurting Researchers and Journalists, BUSINESS INSIDER (Aug. 14, 2017,
7:30
AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/youtube-crackdown-terroristextremist-isis-content-hurting-journalists-researchers-2017-8?r=UK&IR=T; J.M.
BERGER & JONATHON MORGAN, THE ISIS TWITTER CENSUS: DEFINING AND
DESCRIBING THE POPULATION OF ISIS SUPPORTERS ON TWITTER 54–58 (The
Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, Mar. 2015),
available at https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/isis_twitter
_census_berger_morgan.pdf (noting account suspensions could result in potential
loss of key information for law enforcement and terror networks could turn
insular, reducing de-radicalizing influences).
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raise the profile of harmful speech and speakers.134 If the selected
measures are infringing on speech without furthering the legitimate aim,
the company needs to reconsider its options.
In aligning its speech code to the “necessity” prong of ICCPR
Article 19’s tripartite test, Twitter would need to make some revisions to
its existing speech code. First, it should commit publicly to investigating
(and investing in) “good governance” measures that do not infringe on
speech to the extent possible. Second, while Twitter is to be commended
for setting forth a broad range of enforcement options, it should commit
publicly to ensuring its selected response is calibrated to constitute the
least intrusive means. 135 Third, Twitter should also commit to monitor
closely whether the measures it undertakes to promote legitimate aims are
working. If a measure that infringes on speech is not helping to achieve a
legitimate aim, Twitter should revise its approach accordingly.
3. Is Twitter’s Hate Speech Ban Imposed for a Legitimate Aim?
The third prong of ICCPR Article 19(3)’s tripartite test requires
that any speech restriction be imposed for one of the following legitimate
aims that benefit the public interest: respect of the rights or reputations of
others; or the protection of national security, public order, public health,
or morals.136 Under this “legitimacy” test, it would be an invalid reason
and a violation of the ICCPR for a government to impose a speech ban to
end criticism of the head of state (even if administered under the pretext
of “public order”).137 On the other hand, it would be legitimate for a
government to invoke a public order rationale if the true motive for a
speech ban were to stop advocacy likely to result in imminent violence
against a vulnerable minority.138 In sum, this third prong requires the
government to identify in good faith one of the legitimate public interest
reasons for restricting speech.
In translating Article 19(3)’s legitimacy prong from the
governmental context to the corporate context, a threshold question arises:
can we expect corporations to make such public interest determinations
See Masnick, supra note 130 (“[De-platforming] someone from these
platforms often has the opposite impact of what was intended. Depending on the
situation, it might not quite be a ‘Streisand Effect’ situation, but it does create a
martyr situation, which supporters will automatically use to double down on their
belief that they're in the right position, and people are trying to ‘suppress the truth’
or whatever. Also, sometimes it’s useful to have ‘bad’ speech out in the open,
where people can track it, understand it... and maybe even counter it. Indeed, often
hiding that bad speech not only lets it fester, but dulls our ability to counter it,
respond to it and understand who is spreading such info (and how widely).”).
135
As noted previously, further transparency in terms of how these enforcement
mechanisms operate in practice is essential to allow civil society, academics, and
others to assess whether least intrusive means are being selected. See supra text
accompanying note 126.
136
ICCPR, supra note 36, at art. 19, ¶ 3.
137
See GC 34, supra note 39, ¶ 38 (“Moreover, all public figures, including those
exercising the highest political authority such as heads of state and government,
are legitimately subject to criticism and political opposition.”).
138
Aswad, supra note 44, at 1322.
134
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when restricting speech? As Professor Klonick has observed, the main
reason companies remove offensive speech is “the threat that allowing
such material poses to potential profits based in advertising revenue.” 139
Companies are essentially seeking to moderate content on their platforms
in order to meet user expectations so they can maximize profits.140 In our
neo-medieval world, are advertisers essentially the ultimate judges when
it comes to the content of speech codes? Can we expect corporations to
refrain from restricting speech at the expense of their bottom lines? Does
gauging the temperature of most users in determining the scope and
application of speech codes boil down to rule by the majority at the
expense of the minority in our neo-medieval world?141
The legitimacy prong of ICCPR Article 19’s tripartite test seems
to pose the thorniest questions when translating its requirements from the
context of governments to that of corporate actors. There are two main
options worth considering: exempt companies from this prong or hold
them to the public interest assessments contained in Article 19(3).142

139

Klonick, supra note 22, at 1627.
Id. at 1627 (“If a platform creates a site that matches users’ expectations, users
will spend more time on the site and advertising revenue will increase. Take down
too much content and you lose not only the opportunity for interaction, but also
the potential trust of users. Likewise, keeping up all content on a site risks making
users uncomfortable and losing page views and revenues.”). See also GILLESPIE,
supra note 28, at 17 (“[F]rom an economic perspective, all this talk of protecting
speech and community glosses over what in the end matters to platforms more:
keeping as many people on the site spending as much time as possible, interacting
as much as possible.”). Companies may also modify their speech codes (or how
robustly they enforce them) in response to pressure from governments that are
less protective of speech and then apply those standards worldwide in their terms
of service. See Danielle Citron, Extremist Speech, Compelled Conformity, and
Censorship Creep, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1035, 1041–50 (2018) (describing
how U.S. platforms altered their content moderation on extremism and hate
speech in response to threats of European regulation).
141
In the news coverage of prominent platforms banning Alex Jones, some raised
the issue of whether public pressure had triggered the de-platforming. See, e.g.,
Nicas, supra note 23. Twitter’s CEO initially defended his company’s decision
not to ban Mr. Jones by saying “[i]f we succumb and simply react to outside
pressure, rather than straightforward principles we enforce (and evolve)
impartially regardless of political viewpoints, we become a service that’s
constructed by our personal views that can swing in any direction. That’s not
us.” Jack Dorsey (@jack), TWITTER (Aug. 7, 2018, 5:11 PM),
https://twitter.com/jack/status/1026984247750316033 [https://perma.cc/8QWNA25M]. Twitter later interpreted its rules to merit a suspension (and ultimately a
permanent ban) of Alex Jones. Romm, supra note 23.
142
Perhaps a third option could be to allow companies to consider their economic
incentives along with public interest reasons when restricting speech, but
implementation of such an option in practice would likely be dominated by
economic motivations, thereby risking that public interest rationales become mere
pretexts for decisions based on revenue. Rather than incentivizing the use of
public interest rationales as pretexts, it is better to be transparent that the
legitimacy prong is removed for companies (i.e., the first option) or to truly hold
140
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Under the first option, companies would be exempted from having
to justify their restrictions on speech based on public interest
considerations. Because of their nature as entities designed to maximize
shareholder profits, this option assumes that companies cannot be
expected to engage in public interest determinations that conflict with their
earning potential. This option suggests that companies would cite to
public interest determinations as pretexts for revenue-driven outcomes. If
we proceed on this basis, companies would still be expected to respect the
first two prongs of the tripartite test, i.e., companies should make sure their
speech codes are not vague and select the least intrusive enforcement
measure for violations. If companies publicly commit to implementing
the legality and necessity tests of ICCPR Article 19(3), society would
indeed be in a better place in terms of protecting freedom of expression in
our neo-medieval world than what is currently happening.
However, this option (which no longer requires speech restrictions
be linked to the public interest) means that as long as companies adhere to
their own rules that are not vague and only infringe on speech in the least
intrusive way, they could restrict speech for any reason at all, including
maximizing their revenues or promoting their favored policies. If the
normative goal for our neo-medieval world is to develop a path that
continues protecting freedom of expression despite the enormous power
of private platforms over speech, removing the third prong of the tripartite
test is unappealing. Allowing advertising dollars to ultimately decide the
contours of appropriate speech for platforms does not present a
particularly attractive future. And neither is a future in which norms are
established by the whims of the majority of users (or of the most
vociferous users). In such systems, minority and unpopular speakers
would likely not fare well.143 We would risk leaving little space on
platforms for a modern-day Galileo to share inconvenient truths or for
protestors to engage in the digital equivalent of flag burning.
Under the second option, a company would be expected to justify
speech restrictions based on the public interest determinations embodied
in Article 19(3) without consideration of its economic incentives. The
benefit of this option is that corporate speech codes would sync with
international human rights law and seek to afford users the same
(international law) protections as they have against governments,
maintaining the scope of individual freedom of expression in the neomedieval world. However, this option is unrealistic absent a substantial
companies to making public interest determinations when infringing on speech
(i.e., the second option).
143
Recalling the evolution of First Amendment speech protections is instructive
in this regard. For well over a hundred years in the United States, interpretations
of the appropriate scope of freedom of expression through democratically enacted
laws resulted in bans on criticism of the government, slavery, and U.S.
participation in wars. ANTHONY LEWIS, FREEDOM FOR THE THOUGHT WE HATE:
A BIOGRAPHY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 23–38, 157–167 (2007). It was
ultimately the courts (and not a decision by majority rule) that resulted in an
interpretation of the First Amendment that protects unpopular, offensive, and
minority views. Id.
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societal shift regarding the special role of social media platforms as
content moderators affecting discourse.
As Gillespie noted in his overview of content moderation, we
“desperately need a thorough, public discussion about the social
responsibility of platforms.”144 He reflects that this conversation
unfortunately usually happens in the midst of particular controversies
rather than with respect to the role of these platforms generally. 145 He
states that platforms have tried to portray themselves as neutral “conduits,
obscuring and disavowing the content moderation they do,” when in
reality they “invoke and amplify particular forms of discourse, and they
moderate away others, all under the guise of being impartial conduits of
open participation.”146
A broad conversation on the role of social media platforms is
essential to moving forward on the Special Rapporteur’s recommendation
to align corporate speech codes with human rights law. Such a
conversation should explicitly force a reckoning about the basic trade-off
that is at stake: with an ever-increasing amount of speech happening online
in our neo-medieval world, should private platforms be able to develop
substantive speech rules for any reason of their own choosing, or should
individuals be able to enjoy the same rights to freedom of expression
whether they are under the authority of a government or of a global social
media platform? Perhaps such a conversation could trigger a societal shift
from expecting companies ban speech as a measure of good corporate
citizenship to building an expectation that good corporate citizenship
means that platforms should respect international human rights standards
when curating content.147 If there were a growing consensus that platforms
should respect the internationally recognized expression rights of users,
then it would be possible that the economic incentives of companies would
not undermine their ability to conduct public interest determinations. This
could facilitate a path towards implementation of the second option:
holding companies to the legitimacy prong of the tripartite test.
Assuming we could reach such a societal consensus, would
companies then be well-positioned to make public interest determinations?
From the GNI’s experience, we know companies can assess whether
governments are restricting speech based on a legitimate specified public
interest reason or whether restrictions are invoked for illicit motives.148
But this prong continues to pose potentially tricky questions when applied
to corporations as judges of the public interest. If a government has made
144

GILLESPIE, supra note 28, at 206.
Id. at 206.
146
Id. at 206–07.
147
Such a broad conversation may also include consideration of whether some of
the ills of cyberspace (hate speech, extremism, misinformation, etc.) can also be
treated with societal interventions offline. Often to the extent that there is a
conversation on the need for content moderation, the discourse (or news
reporting) seems to stop at what platforms can do about the problem without
considering what society at large can do about the issues.
148
See supra notes 63–67 and accompanying text.
145
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a public interest determination, should it be second-guessed by a
company? For example, if a government does not believe hate speech on
a platform is likely to lead to incitement to violence offline or otherwise
does not risk the rights of others, could a social media company come to a
different conclusion and properly justify a hate speech ban based on
different public interest determinations? Should the level of deference by
a company depend on how democratic the government actor is? 149 If a
company assesses that a government is unable or unwilling to govern in
the public interest, would it then be appropriate for the company to secondguess a government’s public interest determination? Alternatively, should
companies make their own public interest decisions regardless of
determinations that have (or have not) been made by governments?
Applying the third prong of Article 19(3)’s tripartite test raises a number
of questions that would benefit from further conversations by interested
stakeholders to assess the contours of what is feasible and to avoid
corporations invoking public interest rationales as pretexts for revenuedriven decisions.
4. Observations on Applying the UNGPs to Corporate Speech Codes
This analysis concludes that the legality and necessity prongs of
ICCPR Article 19(3)’s tripartite test can be adapted to the corporate
context. Implementation of these two prongs with respect to speech codes
would go a long way in helping to protect freedom of expression online.
For example, in terms of the “legality” test, private speech codes could
(and should) be modified to give concrete guidance rather than relying on
vague prohibitions. Similarly, regarding the “necessity” test, companies
should commit to engaging in the diligence required to select the least
intrusive means of enforcing their speech codes. The third prong of the
tripartite test, however, is the most difficult one to implement because,
under the current state of affairs, expecting companies to disregard key
economic motives in favor of the public interest seems unrealistic. Most
149

Sometimes democratically-elected governments make decisions to limit
speech that are not consistent with international human rights law. European
approaches to limits on hate speech and extremism have recently been criticized
by human rights groups and the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of
Expression. See, e.g., AMNESTY INT’L, DANGEROUSLY DISPROPORTIONATE: THE
EVER-EXPANDING NATIONAL SECURITY STATE IN EUROPE 37–44 (2017)
(criticizing several European countries for laws with vague prohibitions, such as
the “glorifying” or “promoting” of terrorism); David Kaye (Special Rapporteur
on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and
expression), Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of
the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, ¶ 25, U.N. Doc. A/71/373 (Sept.
6, 2016) (criticizing European human rights law for failing to “define hate speech
adequately”). See also Kristen Eichensehr, Digital Switzerlands 167 U. PA. L. REV
(forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 41) (https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/
delivery.php?ID=96302009212308610900908712606901607303307804701002
2006094075126002102113011024125007006058039044111113028125000086
1220690031111230820690480920961200710901100940310350930151221061
0012511006500912212210911308012312603008903006907012410900100708
4120111&EXT=pdf) (“[C]ompanies will ‘fold’—complying with rather than
challenging, government requests—when they perceive governments and users to
be aligned.”).
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likely they would invoke public interest determinations as pretexts for
revenue-driven decisions. That said, if there is a societal shift to expecting
platforms to respect international freedom of expression protections
online, it may be more feasible for companies to make public interest
determinations. But, questions remain that would benefit from additional
multi-stakeholder deliberations about implementation of this prong.

III. REFLECTIONS ON POTENTIAL CRITICISMS AND BENEFITS OF
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AS THE DEFAULT RULE FOR CORPORATE
SPEECH CODES
Having examined the type of revisions to corporate speech codes
that would be triggered if companies align them with ICCPR Article 19,
this analysis next turns to assessing potential criticisms and benefits of the
Special Rapporteur’s proposed approach. A range of potential criticisms
and concerns are examined, including whether international human rights
law provides companies with adequate guidance in regulating speech,
whether U.S. companies should promote First Amendment standards
instead, and potential adverse impacts companies could have on the
international human rights regime. The potential benefits that are
considered include improved free speech protections for individuals in a
neo-medieval world, a principled basis for companies to regulate speech
worldwide, and the fact that the framework to implement this approach is
already in place. This Article concludes that the benefits of progressing
towards alignment of corporate speech codes with international human
rights law outweigh the potential downsides.

A. Criticisms
The Special Rapporteur’s recommended approach has already
been criticized. For example, one commentator questioned the Special
Rapporteur’s proposed approach because “[i]t is something of a misnomer
to speak of international human rights law as if it is a single, self-contained
and cohesive body of rules. Instead, these laws are found in a variety of
international and regional treaties that are subject to differing
interpretations by states that are parties to the conventions as well as
international tribunals applying the laws.” 150
Such a concern
inappropriately conflates international human rights law with separate
bodies of law embodied in regional human rights instruments. 151 The
Evelyn Douek, U.N. Special Rapporteur’s Latest Report on Online Content
Regulation Calls for ‘Human Rights by Default,’ LAWFARE: BLOG (June 6, 2018,
8:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/un-special-rapporteurs-latest-reportonline-content-regulation-calls-human-rights-default (emphasis added).
151
See supra notes 90–97 and accompanying text for a discussion of differences
between the international human rights regime and regional regimes with regard
to freedom of expression. When there are areas of overlap between these systems,
international and regional human rights mechanisms will occasionally make joint
statements on high profile topics, but that does not mean the international and
regional systems are the same or congruous in every regard. See, e.g., UNITED
NATIONS (UN) SPECIAL R APPORTEUR ON FREEDOM OF OPINION & EXPRESSION,
ORG. FOR SEC. & CO-OPERATION IN EUR. (OSCE) REPRESENTATIVE ON FREEDOM
150
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differences between international and regional human rights law do not
make international human rights law’s protection for freedom of
expression internally inconsistent; it just means international and regional
human rights law are separate bodies of law that do not always align.152
The call of the UNGPs (and the Special Rapporteur) is for companies to
respect international, not regional, human rights law. Under international
human rights law, the key protection for speech comes from Article
19(3)’s tripartite test, which applies to all speech restrictions.153
Another potential concern is whether the international human
rights law regime on freedom of expression provides sufficient guidance
to companies in applying speech restrictions.154 Of course, this
international human rights regime on speech is not a detailed tax code
setting forth a comprehensive listing of unprotected terms or phrases for
the entire world. The inherent nature of speech adjudications requires
OF THE MEDIA, & ORG. OF AM. STATES (OAS) SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, & AFRICAN COMM’N ON HUMAN & PEOPLES’ RIGHTS
(ACHPR) SPECIAL R APPORTEUR ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION & ACCESS TO
INFO., JOINT DECLARATION ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND ‘FAKE NEWS’,
DISINFORMATION AND PROPAGANDA (Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.osce.org/

fom/302796?download=true (commemorating that UN and regional free
expression experts endorse several approaches to combatting false news, such as
affirming ICCPR Article 19’s tripartite test for any restrictions, condemning broad
bans on “fake news” as unduly vague, and calling for an end to the criminalization
of defamation); Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and Countering
Violent Extremism, OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
https://www.ohchr.org/En/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=199
15&LangID=E (last visited Aug. 10, 2018) (agreeing on a number of measures to
combat terrorism that inappropriately restrict speech, including vague bans on
“glorification of terrorism” and “apology for terrorism”).
152
It should be noted that nations cannot invoke interpretations of regional human
rights mechanisms to get out of their international obligations. For example,
Germany cannot invoke the case law of the European Court of Human Rights
approving of bans on Holocaust denial under the European Convention on Human
Rights to justify its Holocaust denial bans under the ICCPR. See supra notes 92–
93 and accompanying text, for the differences between the two systems with
regard to denials of historic atrocities.
153
See supra note 47 and accompanying text (explaining that even mandatory
speech bans in international treaties are subject to ICCPR’s Article 19(3)’s
tripartite test).
154
See, e.g., Citron, supra note 140, at 1063 (dismissing international human
rights law as a source of guidance for tech companies in defining hate speech and
terrorist-related speech because “human rights law contains exceptionally flexible
standards” and recommending companies look to European approaches). It should
be noted that the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression has criticized
the vagueness of European human rights law with respect to hate speech. Kaye,
supra note 149. See also David Kaye, How Europe’s New Internet Laws Threaten
Freedom of Expression: Recent Regulations Risk Censoring Legitimate Content,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/
europe/2017-12-18/how-europes-new-internet-laws-threaten-freedomexpression (describing a wave of European regulations, including with respect to
terrorist material and hate speech, that “risk interfering with” international
freedom of expression standards).
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investigations into context and related judgement calls. ICCPR Article
19(3)’s tripartite test does provide a rigorous, principled, and coherent
standard that allows for such judgment calls in considering restrictions on
speech in each country. Despite the fact that there is not a UN court
dedicated to issuing legally binding decisions on proper interpretations of
the ICCPR, the UN’s human rights machinery has provided a substantial
amount of guidance and recommendations in interpreting this article. For
example, after requesting the views of civil society and State Parties, in
2011 the UN Human Rights Committee issued lengthy guidance about
Article 19, ranging from issues of defamation to restrictions based on
national security to access to information. 155 The Special Rapporteur
position has existed since 1993 and has issued numerous reports and
guidance on a variety of issues arising under Article 19.156 Any criticism
that Article 19 does not provide sufficient guidance seems to overlook the
body of recommendations by UN independent experts on this topic. If
companies were to accept the call to regulate speech in line with ICCPR
Article 19(3)’s tripartite test, they would be using an internationally
accepted and principled standard that gives space for consideration of
context in making the judgment calls inherent in speech adjudications.
They would also find the recommendations of the Human Rights
Committee and the Special Rapporteur valuable in implementing such an
approach.
Another criticism could stem from the fact that some may prefer
that American companies curate speech on their platforms in accordance
with the First Amendment, which provides one of the most robust
protections for speech in the world.157 The founders, leading officers, and
legal teams of many prominent U.S. social media companies seem to have
been heavily influenced by First Amendment principles, particularly at the
outset of the companies’ operations.158 However, the speech codes for
155

GC 34, supra note 39, ¶¶ 1–52.
Freedom of Opinion and Expression – Annual Reports, OFFICE OF THE HIGH
COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Freedom
Opinion/Pages/Annual.aspx (last visited Aug. 10, 2018) (analyzing issues ranging
from encryption and anonymity to regulation of online content to the treatment of
whistleblowers).
157
See, e.g., David French, A Better Way to Ban Alex Jones, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/07/opinion/alex-jones-infowarsfacebook.html?action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=storyheading&module=opinion-c-col-right-region&region=opinion-c-col-rightregion&WT.nav=opinion-c-col-right-region (criticizing tech companies for
abandoning First Amendment principles and using subjective standards to ban
Alex Jones from their platforms). See also Noah Feldman, Free Speech Isn’t
Facebook’s Job, BLOOMBERG: BLOOMBERGOPINION (June 1, 2016, 11:08 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-06-01/it-s-not-facebook-s-jobto-guarantee-free-speech (expressing outrage initially at tech companies for
selling out on First Amendment principles but concluding society cannot expect
companies to respect freedom of expression).
158
Klonick, supra note 22, at 1618–25 (finding American lawyers trained in First
Amendment jurisprudence to have heavily influenced the initial speech codes and
approaches of leading platforms); Ammori, supra note 22, at 2283.
156
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such companies have steadily moved away from U.S. constitutional free
speech protections.159 Simply put, we are no longer in a situation in which
prominent companies would be abandoning speech codes that reflect First
Amendment approaches in favor of international approaches. 160
Moreover, a rigorous and good faith interpretation of ICCPR
Article 19’s tripartite test of legality, necessity, and legitimacy would
bring company speech codes much closer to First Amendment standards
than what is currently happening with the curation of speech on platforms.
As previously noted, many company speech codes are vague. 161 Corporate
implementation of ICCPR speech protections means companies would
need to revise their codes to give users appropriate notice of the parameters
of unacceptable speech. The speech codes would also need to be adjusted
so as to not discriminate against any group. 162 Often the combination of
having to overcome vague terminology and avoid discrimination against
any group makes it difficult to craft broad speech bans. 163 In addition,
corporations would need to commit to selecting enforcement options that
reflect the least intrusion on speech interests to be consistent with the
“necessity” prong of the tripartite test.164 Thus, the proper application of
at least the first two prongs of Article 19(3) coupled with other ICCPR
protections, such as the ban on discrimination, would serve as a principled
check on corporate speech bans if applied in good faith. 165
Another potential critique is that the call to align company speech
codes with international human rights law is based on a framework that is
not legally binding, i.e., the UNGPs. This means that grounding speech
codes in international human rights law would be a voluntary action taken
by companies to live up to the international community’s expectations.
Can we entrust the future of freedom of expression online to the mere hope
that companies will voluntarily implement the UNGPs? Perhaps we have
159

Ammori, supra note 22, at 2274–84 (describing how speech codes of U.S.
platforms depart from First Amendment principles but are influenced by the First
Amendment); Citron, supra note 140 (describing how the European Union
pressured American companies to change their approaches to hate speech and
terrorist material).
160
If prominent social media companies had displayed a commitment to
grounding their speech codes in the First Amendment despite pressure from
advertisers and the public, this analysis of the concerns and benefits of aligning
corporate speech codes with international human rights law would be significantly
different.
161
See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
162
See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
163
See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY & HOWARD GILLMAN, FREE SPEECH ON C AMPUS
93–94 (Yale University Press 2017) (assessing that U.S. courts often do not
uphold bans on fighting words because such prohibitions are either vague or show
favoritism towards particular groups).
164
See supra text accompanying notes 112–135.
165
It may also be challenging for a company to justify its speech restriction under
Article 19’s three prong test as “necessary,” for example, to maintain public order
if a government (e.g., the United States) has not assessed there is a public order
problem that justifies speech restrictions. See supra notes 148–149 and
accompanying text.
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to focus on voluntary corporate initiatives for at least two reasons. First,
intervention by the U.S. government is highly unlikely given that First
Amendment protections for corporate speech provide the United States
with little room for legally binding solutions. Second, an international
negotiation to regulate speech on platforms, including content moderation,
is undesirable because it would no doubt be dominated by powerful
countries with weak records on freedom of expression that would seek to
roll back international speech protections. To begin with, global trends
show governments have become more restrictive with respect to online
speech, which means such countries would seek to commemorate their
problematic approaches to online speech in any new international
instrument.166 Such trends coupled with the recent withdrawal by the
United States, a traditional global leader in promoting robust free
expression norms in multilateral fora, from the UN Human Rights Council
(which would likely negotiate any such agreement) means the prospects
for any new international treaty protecting speech as robustly as ICCPR
Article 19(3) does are bleak.167
Moreover, the trajectory of the business and human rights
movement has been positive (though not swift) with companies
increasingly undertaking measures to align their operations with
international human rights standards on a voluntary basis. A 2016 study
found that of 275 General Counsels and senior lawyers surveyed, forty-six
percent of businesses have human rights policies. 168 For companies
making more than ten billion dollars in revenue, eighty-four percent have
human rights policies. 169 As noted previously, within the information and
communication technology sector, companies in the GNI such as Google,
Facebook, Microsoft, and Oath (the successor to Yahoo! and America
Online) have opted to respond to worldwide governmental requests to
restrict speech in ways that seek to avoid infringements on international
human rights.170 Oath has a specialized business and human rights unit
focused on expression and privacy. 171 Many of these companies (and
others) voluntarily issue transparency reports regarding requests from
governments that infringe on expression and privacy and the corporate
166

See, e.g., SANJA KELLY ET AL., FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM ON THE NET 2017:
MANIPULATING SOCIAL MEDIA TO UNDERMINE DEMOCRACY (Nov. 2017),
available at https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FOTN_2017_Final.pdf.
167
See Susan Hannah Allen & Martin S. Edwards, The U.S. Withdrew from the
U.N. Human Rights Council. That’s Not How the Council Was Supposed to Work,
WASH. POST (June 26, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkeycage/wp/2018/06/26/the-u-s-withdrew-from-the-u-n-human-rights-council-thatsnot-how-the-council-was-supposed-to-work/?utm_term=.83478fe1cf27
(discussing U.S. withdrawal from the Council and its implications).
168
James Wood, The New Risk Front for GCs—Nearly Half of Contracts Have
Human Rights Clauses, LB Research Finds, LEGAL BUS.: BLOG (Sept. 8, 2016,
8:46 AM), https://www.legalbusiness.co.uk/blogs/the-new-risk-front-for-gcsnearly-half-of-contracts-have-human-rights-clauses-lb-research-finds/.
169
Id.
170
See supra text accompanying notes 63–67.
171
Business & Human Rights at Oath, OATH, https://www.oath.com/ourstory/business-and-human-rights/ (last visited Aug. 10, 2018).
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actions taken in response.172 The fact that social media companies are
searching for a legitimate basis to regulate speech around the world173
should also incentivize corporate action towards this already established
global standard embodied in ICCPR Article 19.
Yet another potential criticism with regard to encouraging
companies to align their speech codes with international human rights law
is the feasibility of such an endeavor given the scale at which the
companies operate. No government has had to implement its human rights
obligations at the scale at which these global platforms operate. This
Article does not seek to dismiss how challenging it is for companies to
administer their speech codes on a global basis. 174 That said, companies
have already decided to have complex speech rules and are already
applying them globally. They appear to realize that they need more staff
and better procedures to implement their existing codes. 175 Others have
already argued eloquently for better procedural safeguards and
transparency measures in corporate content moderation. 176 The shift
towards grounding the speech codes in international human rights law
merely seeks to anchor the existing global speech curation process to
speech codes that are consistent with international standards for restricting
speech, rather than to speech codes that are “homegrown” approaches to
restricting speech.
Though this section is not exhaustive in terms of potential
criticisms, perhaps two more bear mentioning. With U.S. abandonment of
172

Several prominent social media companies issue transparency reports
concerning governmental requests to remove speech from their platforms, but
YouTube became “the first major social media platform to put out a report on the
number of posts it removes under its own content policy” in April 2018. Liz
Woolery, Companies Finally Shine a Light into Content Moderation Practices,
CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH.: BLOG
(Apr.
25,
2018),
https://cdt.org/blog/companies-finally-shine-a-light-into-content-moderationpractices/.
173
See infra notes 186–189 and accompanying text.
174
For a discussion of the complexity of global content moderation processes, see
Klonick, supra note 22, at 1631–48 and GILLESPIE, supra note 28, at 111–72.
175
See supra note 27 and accompanying text; How Social-Media Platforms
Dispense
Justice,
THE
ECONOMIST
(Sept.
6,
2018),
https://www.economist.com/business/2018/09/08/how-social-media-platformsdispense-justice?fsrc=scn/tw/te/bl/ed/howsocialmediaplatformsdispense
justicethedeciders (reporting that by the end of 2018 “Facebook will have doubled
the number of employees and contractors dedicated to the ‘safety and security’ of
the site, to 20,000, including 10,000 content reviewers. YouTube will have 10,000
people working on content moderation in some form.”). While some companies
have been increasing the number of content moderators, decisions continue to be
made with extraordinary rapidity, which is highly problematic given the time
needed for human judgment in speech adjudication. See GILLESPIE, supra note 28,
at 121 (“Fast here can mean mere seconds per complaint – approve, reject,
approve – and moderators are often evaluated on their speed as well as their
accuracy, meaning there is reward and pressure to keep up…. Each complaint is
thus getting just a sliver of human attention, under great pressure ….”).
176
See supra note 35.
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its seat at the Human Rights Council, there are serious risks of backsliding
at the United Nations on freedom of expression protections, as those
opposed to this right may become more active in future resolutions
involving freedom of expression.177 Although Council resolutions are not
legally binding, they can reflect at times an important political consensus
on speech issues that can impact the rest of the UN’s human rights
machinery.178 Not participating at the Human Rights Council will also
prevent the United States from having a persuasive voice with respect to
the selection of the next Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression,
which could negatively impact future developments on this topic. In
addition, the United States is generally able to have one of its citizens
elected to the UN Human Rights Committee, and that independent expert
traditionally brings important U.S. perspectives to the Committee’s
recommended interpretations of the ICCPR. Recently, the U.S. candidate
was not elected, which means the Human Rights Committee will not have
an independent expert who can bring American experiences and
perspectives to its work.179
This combination of factors could result in a roll-back of freedom
of expression protections at the international level. Though the Human
Rights Committee and Special Rapporteur’s existing guidance should help
to temper such backsliding, regressive recommendations about the scope
of this right could happen.180 If it does, that would be a significant
drawback to linking corporate speech codes to international human rights
law. However, if American companies (with First Amendment roots and
inclinations) become active and effective stakeholders in trying to promote
broad protections for speech under international human rights law, their
influence could potentially serve as a check on such regression in the
absence of U.S. leadership at the Human Rights Council. 181
Peter Micek, Saving the U.N. “Internet Resolution” from Sharks Circling in
Geneva, ACCESS NOW (July 10, 2018, 7:27 PM), https://www.accessnow.org
/saving-the-u-n-internet-resolution-from-sharks-circling-in-geneva/ (“Normally,
the U.S. would have been a key member state working on this [Internet]
resolution. In previous years, the U.S. has been part of the ‘core group’ of authors,
and has co-sponsored the text. But this year the U.S. was absent, having
withdrawn from the Human Rights Council just as the negotiations for this
resolution began. . . . Protecting human rights is difficult and messy work . . . and
leaves people who cannot protect themselves even more vulnerable. If the absence
of the U.S. emboldened states seeking more control over the internet, the lesson
here is clear: those truly committed to human rights must engage more deeply.”).
178
For example, the Special Rapporteur on freedom of opinion and expression
often cites to these resolutions. See, e.g., Kaye, supra note 149, ¶¶ 22, 33, 41, 45.
179
Barbara Crossette, The UN Eyes a World with Less US, THE N ATION (July 30,
2018), https://www.thenation.com/article/un-eyes-world-less-us/.
180
One way forward could be to link corporate speech codes to existing guidance
from the UN’s human rights machinery to avoid negative impacts if regressive
recommendations emerge in the future.
181
For an interesting discussion of the potential for the rise of U.S. technology
companies to serve as a check on governments, see Eichensehr, supra note 149,
at 49 (“[H]aving two powerful regulators, rather than only one, can benefit
individuals’ freedom, liberty, and security because sometimes it takes a powerful
177
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Conversely, there could be concerns about the potential impact
that corporate implementation of international human rights norms could
have on the international human rights regime itself if companies do not
interpret ICCPR Article 19 in good faith. Given that an international
human rights court solely dedicated to adjudicating ICCPR rights does not
exist, the UN machinery’s recommended interpretations of UN standards
have come primarily from the Human Rights Committee, the Special
Rapporteur, and (occasionally) certain high-profile, non-binding
consensus resolutions adopted by UN member states. 182 If companies
begin applying Article 19(3) in their content moderation operations and
take up the Special Rapporteur’s call to produce “case law,” there could
be an active fountain of new “jurisprudence” involving the ICCPR’s
speech protections, which could influence the direction of international
freedom of expression rights. It is thus even more important that
companies apply the international standards in good faith rather than in
revenue-driven ways that could undermine the robustness of the standards
with respect to state actors. This seems to be a risk that is worth taking in
order to afford ICCPR protections for users’ speech when they are under
the authority of platforms.183 The alternative is to leave individuals under
speech codes that are untethered to any traditional sources of restraint in
regulation, i.e., the First Amendment or international human rights law.

B. Benefits
A number of significant benefits exist to grounding the substantive
restrictions of company speech codes in international human rights law.
First and foremost, anchoring corporate speech codes to ICCPR Article 19
represents the best chance of protecting the freedom of expression interests
for users throughout the world. As previously discussed, companies
currently set substantive speech codes as they see fit. While they may
have started out heavily influenced by the First Amendment, their codes
have steadily moved away from that standard due to revenue concerns,
public pressure, and governmental pressure to re-interpret their terms of
service in a more restrictive way. 184 As the U.S. government is unlikely
to regulate the speech codes of private companies given constitutional
protections for corporate speech rights and international regulation of such

regulator to challenge and check another powerful regulator.”). Admittedly, the
role of strengthening the human rights regime seems to go beyond what is called
for in the UNGPs, but it would be consistent with the companies’ mission
statements to promote the free flow of information and self-interest to promote
broad expression rights online.
182
See, e.g., Human Rights Council Res. 20/8, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/20/8, ¶ 1
(July 16, 2012) (affirming for the first time that individuals have the same rights
online as they have offline); Council Res. 16/18, supra note 115 and
accompanying text.
183
Some of the suggestions proposed by the Special Rapporteur’s report—
involving improved transparency, procedures, and oversight for content
moderation—may be helpful in assessing whether companies are respecting the
standards in ICCPR Article 19’s tripartite test. See SR Report, supra note 79.
184
See supra notes 139–140 and accompanying text.
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codes is undesirable,185 seeking to have companies align their speech
codes with international human rights law remains the best avenue for
protecting individuals’ speech rights in our neo-medieval world. The
alternative would be for each company to develop its own code based on
its own views of speech and revenue needs, which is not a stable
foundation for the long-term protection of speech. The fact that Twitter
and Facebook recently expressed an openness to considering international
human rights law in their speech codes also gives momentum to this
path.186
Aligning speech codes with the ICCPR also has a number of
benefits for companies. Major platforms appear to be seeking a principled
basis for regulating speech in every country of the world in order to give
legitimacy to their global content moderation. For example, Facebook
CEO Mark Zuckerberg stated:
With a community of more than 2 billion people all around the world,
in every different country, where there are wildly different social and
cultural norms, it’s just not clear to me that us sitting in an office here
in California are best placed to always determine what the policies
should be for people all around the world. And I’ve been working on
and thinking through: How can you set up a more democratic or
community-oriented process that reflects the values of people around
the world? That’s one of the things that I really think we need to get
right. Because I’m just not sure that the current state is a great one.187

Similarly, a lawyer working for Google in 2006 was tasked with figuring
out how to respond to the Thai government’s demand to remove offensive
YouTube videos of the king. 188 After meeting with Thai people and
observing how shaken ordinary citizens were by these insults to their king,
she felt “Who am I, a U.S. attorney sitting in California to tell them: ‘No,
we’re not taking that down.’”189 She and her team removed the videos
from view within Thailand. 190
Companies need not recreate the wheel in developing speech
norms that have worldwide legitimacy if they base their content
moderation policies on international human rights standards. Since 1966,
there has been an international treaty (the ICCPR) that protects freedom
of expression with an international machinery for monitoring its
implementation.
Aligning company speech codes with existing
international human rights law would give companies a legitimate,
principled, and international basis upon which to make decisions that
affect freedom of expression throughout the world. For example, instead
185

See supra notes 166–167 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text.
187
Ezra Klein, Mark Zuckerberg on Facebook’s Hardest Year, and What Comes
Next, VOX (Apr. 2, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/2018/4/2/17185052/
mark-zuckerberg-facebook-interview-fake-news-bots-cambridge.
188
Klonick, supra note 22, at 1623.
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Id.
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Id.
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of struggling for a way to justify his decision to permit Holocaust denial
posts on his platform, Mr. Zuckerberg could have cited to the UN Human
Rights Committee’s interpretation of ICCPR Article 19.191 Similarly, in
the case of the YouTube videos mocking royalty in Thailand, a corporate
decision grounded in this Committee’s recommendations192 might have
appeared more principled to Thai citizens than what they were left with—
the views of lawyers in Silicon Valley.
Companies would also benefit from linking their speech codes to
international human rights law because countries often pressure
companies (1) to interpret their own terms of service in a restrictive
manner, or (2) to remove content from their platforms that conflicts with
local law but would otherwise be protected by international human rights
law. Grounding corporate speech codes in Article 19 of the ICCPR can
help companies better resist such measures under either situation. For
example, if Europe pressures tech companies to interpret their hate speech
codes loosely or to remove illegal hate speech under unrealistic time
frames, companies could push back by saying their codes are aligned with
international human rights law and thus cannot be interpreted or
implemented in such a fashion. Similarly, it places companies in an
untenable spot to say to governments: “We will not remove speech critical
of the government because you need to respect users’ international
freedom of expression rights, but we can certainly remove that content if
we feel like it.” Companies will be on firmer ground to resist illicit
governmental demands and laws if they treat user speech as protected
under the same rubric for corporate speech codes and governmental
regulation.
Aligning corporate speech codes with international human rights
law protections, which is what the UNGPs call for, has the added benefit
of providing a way forward that does not require international negotiations
191

The UN Human Rights Committee has taken the position that laws that restrict
opinion about historical facts are an unacceptable infringement on speech. GC 34,
supra note 39, ¶ 49 (“Laws that penalize the expression of opinions about
historical facts are incompatible with the obligations that the Covenant imposes
on States parties in relation to the respect for freedom of opinion and expression.
The Covenant does not permit general prohibition of expressions of an erroneous
opinion or an incorrect interpretation of past events.”).
192
The UN Human Rights Committee has criticized laws that protect royalty or
heads of state from criticism. GC 34, supra note 39, ¶ 38 (“[T]he Committee has
observed that in circumstances of public debate concerning public figures in the
political domain and public institutions, the value placed by the Covenant upon
uninhibited expression is particularly high. Thus, the mere fact that forms of
expression are considered to be insulting to a public figure is not sufficient to
justify the imposition of penalties, albeit public figures may also benefit from the
provisions of the Covenant. Moreover, all public figures, including those
exercising the highest political authority such as heads of state and government,
are legitimately subject to criticism and political opposition. Accordingly, the
Committee expresses concern regarding laws on such matters as, lese majesty,
desacato, disrespect for authority, disrespect for flags and symbols, defamation
of the head of state and the protection of the honour of public officials . . . .”).
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about how to tackle the rise of private sector regulation of speech. The
UNGPs already exist, were endorsed by consensus at the Human Rights
Council, and reflect the international community’s expectations that
companies will respect human rights in all their operations, including
content moderation. Similarly, the ICCPR already exists and rigorous
application of Article 19(3) provides a strong check against inappropriate
restrictions on speech. Engaging in international negotiations to develop
a way forward with respect to transnational private sector content
moderation creates an unacceptable risk of regression in free expression
rights for a variety of reasons previously discussed. 193 In sum, there is
significant value to using an international regime that already exists, has
global approval, and that, if applied properly, would result in corporations
respecting the international freedom of expression rights of users
throughout the world.

C. Observations on Criticisms and Benefits
Overall, while some potential pitfalls exist to anchoring corporate
speech codes to international human rights law, the benefits seem to
outweigh such downsides. In particular, this approach appears to be the
most viable route to promote corporate respect for individuals’ freedom of
expression rights in a neo-medieval world. In addition, this approach
would likely increase companies’ legitimacy in content moderation while
also help companies resist demands from governments to restrict speech
in ways at odds with international human rights law. Given that we appear
to be in a unique norm-setting moment in the thinking of platforms with
regard to the substantive content of their speech codes, this approach
provides the best available way forward for users and companies.

IV. CONCLUSION
Recent events, such as Facebook’s removal of a post that
contained an “offensive” part of the Declaration of Independence and its
subsequent decision to permit Holocaust denial posts on its platform as
well as the decision of many tech giants to de-platform a conspiracy
theorist, have highlighted the enormous power of corporate actors over
freedom of expression. Though much of the commentary to date has
focused on the need for platforms to increase transparency and add
procedural safeguards for users when moderating content, the summer of
2018 seemed to mark a norm-setting opportunity for the substantive
content of corporate speech codes. In June 2018, the UN Special
Rapporteur on expression called on companies to align their speech codes
193

See supra notes 166–167, 177. Also, on the domestic level, the constant
debates about whether to treat platforms as utilities, publishers, or something else
are also not likely to reach a resolution that would resolve the substantive issues
of corporate speech codes in time to affect the existing norm setting moment. For
a discussion of the legal issues involved, see Klonick, supra note 22, at 1660–63.
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with international human rights law. After the controversy surrounding
whether to de-platform Alex Jones, two social media giants seemed open
to considering international human rights law as a basis for their speech
decisions.
This Article set out to analyze what it would mean in practice for
such companies to align their speech codes with international human rights
law: specifically, whether it is feasible for companies to do so and whether
such an outcome is desirable. This Article began with an overview of
applicable international human rights law standards. The ICCPR, the most
relevant treaty on freedom of expression, provides broad protections for
speech across borders, but permits restrictions on speech if every prong of
Article 19(3)’s tripartite test is met. The prongs are as follows: any
restriction (1) must not be vague, and (2) must constitute the “least
intrusive means” to (3) achieve a legitimate public interest. Under
international human rights law, any restriction on speech must meet this
tripartite test, even those restrictions imposed under treaty provisions that
mandate barring incitement to violence and other harms. While Article 19
is not directly applicable to companies (as they are private actors and not
states), the 2011 UNGPs reflect the international community’s expectation
that companies will arrange their business operations, including their
terms of service, to respect international human rights.
In order to assess the feasibility of aligning corporate speech codes
with the ICCPR, this Article focused on a concrete example: Twitter’s hate
speech rules. With respect to the first prong of Article 19(3)’s tripartite
test, the analysis found that Twitter’s rules were vague and would need to
be revised to give users more notice of what is not allowed. In analyzing
the second prong of the tripartite test in the context of a corporate actor,
this Article argued that a company should (1) evaluate the means at its
disposal to achieve a legitimate aim without infringing on speech; (2)
select enforcement options for speech code violations that least intrude on
speech interests; and (3) periodically assess whether the selected measure
helps to achieve the legitimate aim. This Article noted that Twitter should
commit publicly to using the least intrusive enforcement actions to deal
with speech code violations. With respect to the third prong—regulating
speech for the public interest—this Article observed that companies
generally regulate speech based on revenue-related motivations, which
could make this prong challenging to implement in good faith. This
Article recommended a broad societal conversation to clarify the role of
platforms in the protection of speech, which would help facilitate public
interest determinations. Overall, aligning corporate speech codes with
much of ICCPR Article 19’s tripartite test is feasible, but further
discussion is needed with respect to the role of companies in making
public interest determinations.
In considering the desirability of having companies align their
speech codes with international human rights law, this Article also
considered a variety of potential criticisms of such an approach. It
concluded that arguments of the alleged incoherency of international
human rights law often inappropriately conflate the international human
rights regime with regional regimes rather than reflecting an analysis of
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the ICCPR. This Article determined that criticisms of human rights law
not providing sufficient guidance to companies actually do not fully grasp
how ICCPR Article 19(3)’s tripartite test works, the recommended
interpretations of the UN’s human rights machinery, or the fact that speech
adjudications inherently involve judgment calls that consider contextual
factors. To the extent commentators would prefer American companies to
enforce First Amendment principles in content moderation, this Article
noted that the speech codes of prominent platforms no longer reflect such
principles, and a proper application of Article 19(3)’s tripartite test would
likely protect more speech than is currently the case. While recognizing
that the UNGPs reflect the international community’s expectations but do
not constitute a legally binding framework, this Article noted the trajectory
of the business and human rights movement has been positive, and the
corporate interests in adjudicating speech based on universally accepted
standards could incentivize voluntary adoption of the Special Rapporteur’s
recommended approach. The analysis also noted that U.S. regulation is
unlikely and international regulation is undesirable, as it would likely
result in a substantial diminution of international free speech protections.
But the analysis expressed concerns about the implications for future
developments at the international level on freedom of expression given
U.S. withdrawal from the UN Human Rights Council.
This Article ultimately concluded that the advantages of aligning
corporate speech codes with international human rights law outweigh the
potential disadvantages. This approach seems to be the most feasible way
to protect against infringements on users’ freedom of expression rights by
private actors. The approach should also be appealing to companies who
seem to be grappling to find a principled basis upon which to regulate
speech worldwide, as well as a principled basis on which to resist
governmental demands that violate freedom of expression. The fact that
international human rights law and the UNGPs reflect an international
consensus is also a valuable aspect of this approach, as it avoids lengthy
and potentially problematic international negotiations involving corporate
speech codes. In our neo-medieval world, the most viable way to protect
individuals’ freedoms of expression rights is to seek to have governments
implement their international human rights obligations regarding speech
and encourage companies to align their codes with these standards.
Since Eleanor Roosevelt led the U.S. delegation in negotiating the
ICCPR, U.S. diplomats have consistently fought in UN fora to maintain
broad speech protections under international law. With the rise of
powerful corporate actors engaging in a parallel governance exercise over
speech alongside governments throughout the world, it is important for
these companies to recognize that in many ways they have been handed
the baton of respecting and promoting international freedom of expression
protections. American platforms may not have asked to be in this position,
but this is an important norm-setting moment in which tech giants could
greatly and positively influence the future of freedom of expression online.
They should acknowledge their roles as powerful co-regulators of speech
and hold themselves to the same protections for freedom of expression that
apply to state actors. We should be encouraging companies to respect
international human rights in our brave neo-medieval world or face a
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future in which their speech codes are untethered to any speech-protective
norms.

